New Jersey's Recent Employment Manual Decisions:
Traditional Contract Law Abandoned in Favor of an
Employee's Unreasonable Expectations
INTRODUCTION

Despite protestations to the contrary, the New Jersey judiciary
has seriously eroded the doctrine of at-will employment.' With
each exercise of judicial activism, the New Jersey Supreme Court
has steadily expanded the rights of employees while restricting the
freedom of employers to terminate employees on a discretionary
basis.2 Perhaps the most cogent example of this trend is the
1 See generally Witkowski v. ThomasJ. Lipton, Inc., 136 N.J. 385, 397, 643 A.2d 546,
552 (1994) (citing English v. College of Medicine & Dentistry, 73 N.J. 20, 23, 372 A.2d
295, 297 (1977) (stating that in New Jersey an employer may terminate an employee
for any reason at all under the at-will doctrine)); Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co.,
117 N.J. 539, 561, 569 A.2d 793, 804 (1990) (claiming that although it may be "unfair," the firing of an at-will employee without cause is lawful). See also McQuitty v.
General Dynamics Corp., 204 N.J. Super. 514, 520, 499 A.2d 526, 529 (App. Div. 1985)
(contending that Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. is not a deviation from the employment at-will rule); Kevin C. Donovan & DavidJ. Reilly, Employment "By the Book" in New
Jersey: Woolley and Its Progeny, 22 SETON HALL L. REv. 814, 816 (1992) (asserting that
Wooley, a landmark case that for the first time in New Jersey found an implied contract in an employment handbook, thus limiting the at-will doctrine, was "not an abrogation of the employment at-will presumption"). But see Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche,
Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 290, 491 A.2d 1257, 1260 (1985), modified, 101 N.J. 10, 499 A.2d 515
(1985) (declaring the NewJersey Supreme Court's rejection of an adherence to rules
that uphold the employment at-will presumption). For a complete discussion of the
Woolley decision, see infra notes 31-36 and accompanying text. Practitioners who litigate under these decisions, however, have a different view. See, e.g., Rosemary Alito,
Employment Law, 138 NJ. L.J. SuPP.71, 71 (1994) (observing that the court has "raised
serious questions for employers as to how much real ability they have left to exercise
the employment-at-will rights the [c]ourt continues to say they have").
The broadest interpretation of the doctrine of at-will employment allows for the
dismissal of employees at any time "for good cause, for no cause or even for cause
morally wrong." Kelly McWilliams, Note, The Employment Handbook as a Contractual
Limitationon the Employment At Will Doctrine,31 ViLE. L. REv. 335, 335 n.1 (1986) (quotation omitted). Various judicial and statutory limitations on the doctrine, however,
render this interpretation an inaccurate reflection of its current status. See generally
infra notes 31-92 and accompanying text (discussing the contractual enforcement of
employment manuals and the public policy and implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing exceptions to the at-will rule). A concise definition of the doctrine can be
found in the California Labor Code, which states: "[ain employment, having no specified term, may be terminated at the wil of either party on notice to the other." CAL.
LAB. CODE § 2922 (West 1989) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the employee is free
to terminate the employment relationship at any time and for any reason. Richard A.
Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Wil, 51 U. CHin. L. REv. 947, 966 (1984).
2 Alito, supra note 1, at 71; see infra notes 27-92 and accompanying text (discussing
judicially-created restrictions on an employer's powers of arbitrary termination).
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court's expansive treatment of employee handbooks' as binding
unilateral contracts between employer and employee. 4 These interpretations transform the status of employment at-will to that of
employment terminable only for cause. 5 Two recent supreme
court decisions, Witkowski v. ThomasJ. Lipton, Inc.6 and its companion case, Nicosia v. Wakefem Food Corp., 7 embody the judiciary's latest liberal interpretation of employment manuals.8
Existing exceptions to the employment at-will doctrine 9
demonstrate that courts need not resort to imaginative contract
analysis to provide legal recourse for plaintiffs claiming wrongful
discharge. 0 For example, public policy based considerations provide a broad range of causes of action for employees challenging
discretionary termination." In addition, an employee may bring
suit under a theory of the employer's breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, inherent in all employment

3 Throughout this Comment, the terms employee handbook, policy manual, and
employment manual are used interchangeably.
4 See infra notes 31-72 and accompanying text (discussing the judiciary's enforcement of policy manuals as binding promises against the employer). A unilateral contract is an agreement in which only one party promises performance. Friedman v.
Tappan Dev. Corp., 22 N.J. 523, 533, 126 A.2d 646, 651 (1956). In contrast, the parties to a bilateral contract each undertake a promise for a promise. 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RicHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CoNTRACTs § 1:17, at 41 (4th ed.
1990).
5 See Woolley, 99 N.J. at 285-86, 491 A.2d at 1258 (holding that implied promises
found in employment manuals may modify a formerly at-will relationship into one
that may be terminated only for cause); cf. Witkowski, 136 N.J. at 399, 643 A.2d at 553
(enunciating circumstances that will rebut the at-will presumption); see also Nicosia v.
Wakefern Food Corp., 136 N.J. 401, 412, 643 A.2d 554, 559-60 (1994) (quoting Woolley, 99 N.J. at 309, 491 A.2d at 1271) (demonstrating that an effective disclaimer may
negate the provisions of a manual that alter an employee's at-will status); Donovan &
Reilly, supra note 1, at 814 (observing that Woolley significantly altered the employment relationship).
6 136 NJ. 385, 643 A.2d 546 (1994).
7 136 N.J. 401, 643 A.2d 554 (1994).
8 Witkowski, 136 N.J. 385, 643 A.2d 546; Nicosia, 136 N.J. 401, 643 A.2d 554; see
infra notes 37-66 and accompanying text (discussing the Witkowski and Nicosia
decisions).
9 See infra notes 73-92 (articulating both decisional and statutory deviations from
the employment at-will rule that rest on a sounder jurisprudential base than the contractual enforcement of employee handbooks).
10 Glenn Harris, Comment, 17 RUTGERs L.J. 715, 728-32 (1986) (noting that the
NewJersey Supreme Court's contract analysis in Woolley ignores basic elements of contract law); see also id. at 728 n.26 (offering alternative bases for the court's decision
other than contrived contract analysis).
11 See infra notes 73-86 and accompanying text (discussing the New Jersey judiciary's adoption of the public policy exception to at-will employment).
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contracts.

This Comment examines the current status of the at-will employment doctrine in New Jersey in light of recent decisions interpreting employment manuals as enforceable contracts. Part I
provides a brief historical overview of the employment at-will doctrine and its treatment in New Jersey. Part II focuses on the evolution of New Jersey decisional law as it pertains to unilateral
contract analysis of employee handbooks and the ramifications of
the Witkowski and Nicosia decisions. Part III suggests alternative
rights of action available to an employee who believes that he or
she was wrongfully discharged. Part IV concludes that the recent
handbook decisions result in increased contractual liability for employers due to a virtual abandonment of fundamental principles of
contract law.
I.

WHEN "AT-WILL"

MEANT AT WILL13

Contemporary employment contract jurisprudence is rooted
in the aftermath of the Black Plague in fourteenth century England.14 The decimation of the populace turned an able-bodied
worker into a very marketable commodity.1 5 This demand led to
an almost one-sided distribution of bargaining power in favor of
the working class.' 6 In an effort to balance this new distribution of
power, King Edward enacted the Statutes of Labourers in 1349,
12 See infra notes 87-92 and accompanying text (discussing the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing as a wrongful discharge cause of action).

13 Professor Richard Epstein captured the essence of the doctrine best by
explaining that "the phrase 'at will' is two words long and has the convenient virtue of
meaning just what it says, no more and no less." Epstein, supra note 1, at 955.
14 CHARL-s G. BAALY, JR. &JOEL M. GROSSMAN, TH MODERN LAw OF EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONSHIPS § 1.1, at 3 (2d ed. Supp. 1993).
15 Id. This is not hard to imagine, considering that the Black Death had claimed
nearly half the population. 2 Sm WILLIAM HOLswORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw

460 (4th ed. 1936).
16 2 HOLDswoRTH, supra note 15, at 460. Feudal landlords were hard pressed to
find laborers to cultivate the land or to perform tenant services for money rents. Id.
England's evolving manufacturing industry was also victimized by the labor shortage.
3 SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 204 (4th ed. 1936). Thus,
any available free laborer was able to command any wage he pleased. 2 HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 15, at 460. Villeins, however, received no such benefit from the spread of
the Plague. See generaUy 2 id. at 464-65 (distinguishing between the different societal
classes of the Middle Ages). A villein, under feudal law, was "a person attached to a
manor, who was substantially in the condition of a slave, who performed the base and

servile work upon the manor for the lord, and was, in most respects, a subject of
property belonging to him." BLAcK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1569 (6th ed. 1990). The increased appreciation of human resources caused many villeins to desert the manor
and seek paid employment, thus precipitating the demise of villeinage in medieval
English society. 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra, at 500-01.
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which imposed the threat of criminal prosecution upon those able
to work, but who refused to do so.1 7 This series of enactments engendered the "English view" of employment contracts, establishing
a yearly presumption of the contract term." Early NewJersey deci17 BAKAL1 & GROSSMAN, supra note 14, § 1.1, at 3. The original statutes were continually amended over the next 200 years. Cheryl S. Massingale, At-Will Employment:
Going, Going. . ., 24 U. RicH. L. Rv. 187, 188 n.5 (1990). The Statutes of Labourers
formed the basis of the law of master and servant. 2 HoLwswoRTH, supra note 15, at
460. Holdsworth articulated four principles underlying the Statutes of Labourers:
(i) All persons coming within the statutes and able to work, must do so.
(ii) They must work at a reasonable rate. Later statutes recognized that
this reasonable rate could not be absolutely fixed, but must vary with
the price of the necessaries of life. But both the wages of labour and the
price of necessaries must be fixed at a reasonable rate. (iii) A refusal to
work for this reasonable wage by those who were able to do so was a
criminal offence. It was also an offence to give more wages than those
fixed by law; and proceedings, which, like the writ of trespass, partook
both of a criminal and of a civil character, could be taken against a
servant who left his master's service and against a person who enticed
him away. (iv) Only the impotent poor were allowed to solicit alms.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
The statutes applied only to hired servants; tenant laborers in possession of the
land were not subject to its provisions. Id. The Statutes of Labourers made it a crime
for any capable worker not to work, thereby virtually eliminating the advantages
gained by the laborers. BAKALY & GROSSMAN, supra note 14, § 1.1, at 3. The statutes
also criminalized any payment of wages that exceeded a reasonable rate. Id. Under
the statutes, hirings were for terms of one year, and a worker could be terminated
only for just cause during that term of employment. Massingale, supra, at 188. Conversely, the law required the worker to serve the entire year, or become subject to
criminal penalties. Bernard v. IMI Sys., Inc., 131 N.J. 91, 99, 618 A.2d 338, 342
(1993). The agrarian economy of feudal England formed the basis of these yearly
cycles. Id. at 97, 618 A.2d at 341. Thus, despite its draconian measures and oppressive tone, the law achieved somewhat of a balance-laborers were assured employment during the long winter months, when farming activity was at it lowest, and labor
shortages were prevented during peak seasons. Id. at 98, 618 A.2d at 342. Colonial
law adopted a similar philosophy. BAALY & GROSSMAN, supra note 14, § 1.1, at 3.
The underlying principles of the Statutes of Labourers are still adhered to in
modern English jurisprudence, notwithstanding the repeal of the law over 130 years
ago. Massingale, supra at 188. The inception of the Statutes of Laborers brought with
it a marked shift in employment law-the evolution of the employment relationship
premised upon feudal status to that based on contract. BAKALY & GROSSMAN, supra
note 14, § 1.1, at 4; 2 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 15, at 461 (noting that prior to fourteenth century legislation recognizing the employment relationship as contractual,
the master-servant relationship had been regulated by status). See generally 1 HENRY H.
PERmr-rr, JR., EMPLOYEE DIsMISSAL LAw AND PRACrcE §§ 1.3-1.4, at 8-12 (3d ed. 1992)
(discussing the employment relationship prior to the Industrial Revolution and the
genesis of the at-will doctrine).
18 1 WiLiAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARiS *425 (footnotes omitted). Sir William
Blackstone, a justice of His Majesty's Court of Common Pleas, enunciated the English
view in 1765:
The first sort of servants, therefore, acknowledged by the laws of England, are menial servants so called from being intra moenia, or domestics.
The contract between them and their masters arises upon the hiring. If
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sional law partially adopted this view.19
the hiring be general, without any particular time limited, the law construes it to be a hiring for a year; upon a principle of natural equity, that
the servant shall serve, and the master maintain him, throughout all the
revolutions of the respective seasons, as well when there is work to be
done, as when there is not: but the contract may be made for any larger
or smaller term.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
Commentators cite this selection as support for the proposition that early English
jurisprudence established and secured the yearly presumption of employment contracts. See, e.g., Michael A. Chagares, Comment, Limiting the Employment-at-Will Rule:
Enforcing Policy Manual Promises Through UnilateralContractAnalysis, 16 SETON HALL L.
Riv. 465, 470 n.30 (1986); see also Bernard, 131 N.J. at 98, 618 A.2d at 342 (observing
that Blackstone's writings "entrenched" this contractual interpretation of the employment relationship into the laws of England). A closer perusal of Blackstone's Commentaries, however, suggests that this presumption was not firmly rooted in English law.
See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra, at *426-27. The aforequoted passage applies only to "domestics," a class of workers who lived with families. 1 id. at *425. Blackstone discusses
further subdivisions of the working class, namely "[a] third species of servants are
labourers,who are hired only by the day or the week, and do not live intra moenia, as
part of the family." 1 id. at *426-27 (footnote omitted). Other historical accounts of
English law support this proposition. See, e.g., 4 SIR WILIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY
or ENGUSH LAw 382-83 (4th ed. 1936) (stating, "the [Elizabethan Statutes of
Labourers] followed earlier precedents by prescribing that, in a large number of specified employments, the hiring must be for one year ... but these rules did not apply
in the case of workmen hired by the day or week, or to do a particular piece of work")
(footnotes omitted). Thus, a more complete reading of Blackstone rebuts the argument that the English view provided substantially greater job security than the American view embodied in Wood's Rule. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra, at *426-27. Wood's
Rule established the employment at-will doctrine in the United States. J. Peter Shapiro &James F. Tune, Note, Implied ContractRights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REv. 335,
341 (1973-74).
19 Robert B. Gidding, Comment, Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.: Is the Public Policy Exception to the At Will Doctrine a Bad Omen for the Employment Relationship?, 33
RUTGERS L. REv. 1187, 1189 (1981); see, e.g., Willis v. Wyllys Corp., 98 N.J.L. 180, 181,
119 A. 24, 24 (1922), overruled by Bernard v. IMI Sys., Inc., 131 N.J. 91, 618 A.2d 338
(1993). The Willis court noted that previous New Jersey decisions favored such an
interpretation. Id. It is of some significance, however, that the analyses of the Willis
opinion and the authorities upon which it relied were somewhat limited in scope. Id.
at 182, 119 A. at 24-25.
The yearly durations found by the courts had been based solely upon the scheduled salary disbursements stipulated in offer letters, which were treated as contracts.
Id.; see also Dennis v. Thermoid Co., 128 N.J.L. 303, 304-05, 25 A.2d 886, 887 (1942)
(explaining that employment continued past the first yearly term is presumed not to
be terminable until expiration of the next yearly term). Other states utilized similar
reasoning to find that employment at a specific price for a specific duration constituted definite employment for that period, notwithstanding any express language in
the agreement to the contrary. Lary S. Larson, Why We Should Not Abandon the Phesumption that Employment is Terminable At-Wil, 23 IDAHo L. REv. 219, 221-22 (1987).
Nevertheless, this remained the minority view in the United States. Id.
The New Jersey Supreme Court essentially removed wage stipulations as a determinant of at-will employment status by expressly overruling Willis in 1993. Bernard,
131 N.J. at 96, 618 A.2d at 341 ("We agree that in the absence of a contrary agree-
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Although some fora accepted the English rule, the majority of
jurisdictions embraced a different perspective-the presumption
that the term of employment was for an indefinite duration and
could be terminated at the will of either party.2 0 A vast majority of
commentators credit an 1877 treatise by Professor Horace G.
Wood as establishing this doctrine of at-will employment, also
known as the "American view." 1 The national economic growth of
ment, an employee is hired at-will, regardless of the way in which the salary is quoted
in an offer letter.").
20 1 PERRr, supra note 17, § 1.4, at 13. The American judiciary overwhelmingly
accepted this interpretation, soundly rejecting the English view. Id. at nn.58-59 (citing Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 42 N.E. 416 (N.Y. 1895); Murphy v. American
Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1983)) (other citations omitted). The pervasiveness of the English view is evidenced by cases wherein the employment contract
was not the main issue under consideration. Shapiro & Tune, supra note 18, at 346
n.82.
21 See, e.g., Shapiro & Tune, supra note 18, at 341; Chagares, supra note 18, at 469;
Harris, supranote 10, at 718; McWilliams, supranote 1, at 337; see also Bernard, 131 N.J.
at 100, 618 A.2d at 343. "Wood's Rule" expressly repudiates the concepts governing a
general hiring as enunciated by Blackstone:
With us the rule is inflexible that a general or indefinite hiring is prima
facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly
hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof. A hiring at so
much a day, week, month or year, no time being specified, is an indefinite hiring, and no presumption attaches that it was for a day even, but
only at the rate fixed for whatever time the party may serve.
H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134, at 272 (1877)
(footnote omitted).
Commentators and jurists alike have attacked this proposition as having little or
no support in the American case law cited by Wood to justify his position. See, e.g.,
Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1030 (Ariz. 1985) (observing that both courts and commentators condemn the rule as bereft of precedential
foundation); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 886-90 (Mich.
1980) (presenting a condensed analysis of Wood's citations and the initial cases
adopting Wood's Rule); 1 PER~r-r, supra note 17, § 1.4, at 13 n.62 (briefly discussing
the authorities cited by Wood and finding no support in three out of the four) (citing
Wilder v. United States, 5 Ct. Cl. 462 (1869), rev'd, 80 U.S. 254 (1872); DeBriar v.
Minturn, 1 Cal. 450 (1851); Tatterson v. Suffolk Mfg. Co., 106 Mass. 56 (1870); Franklin Mining Co. v. Harris, 24 Mich. 115 (1871)); Shapiro & Tune, supra note 18, at 34145 (harshly criticizing Wood's analysis and early judicial applications of the rule).
At least one commentator, however, suggested that such criticism is misplaced
due to a common misinterpretation of the rule. Larson, supra note 19, at 220-21. Still
others assert that the at-will doctrine was not developed by Wood at all, citing
Hathaway v. Bennett, a New York Court of Appeals decision utilizing the doctrine 20
years prior to the publication of Wood's treatise. BAKALY & GROSSMAN, supra note 14,
§ 1.5, at 10-11 (citing Hathaway v. Bennett, 10 N.Y. 108, 113 (1854)).
Post-1887 decisions transformed the rebuttable presumption of Wood's Rule,
that an indefinite hiring constituted at-will employment, into an absolute presumption. McWilliams, supra note 1, at 338-39. Thus, a discharged employee seeking redress for breach of an implied contract term was forced to overcome a higher burden
of proof. See 1 PERRrrr, supra note 17, § 1.4, at 14. Most courts went even further,
construing permanent employment contracts as having an indefinite duration, and

1502

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:1496

the Industrial Revolution and the accompanying laissez-faire philosophy precipitated the almost universal adoption of Wood's Rule
as governing employment duration.2 2 In fact, the at-will doctrine
had become so firmly entrenched in American jurisprudence that
it enjoyed brief constitutional status in the early part of the
23
century.
accordingly characterizing the contract as terminable at will. Id.; see also Savarese v.
Pyrene Mfg. Co., 9 N.J. 595, 600-01, 89 A.2d 237, 239-40 (1952) (quoting Eilen v.
Tappin's, Inc., 16 N.J. Super. 53, 55-56, 83 A.2d 817, 818 (Law Div. 1951)) (stating the
general prevailing rule that permanent employment contracts are of indefinite
duration).
22 Charles A. Brake, Jr., Note, Limiting the Right to Terminate at Will-Have the Courts
Forgotten the Employer?, 35 VA~N. L. REv. 201, 207-08 (1982); see also PERur, supra note
17, § 1.4, at 10-12 (focusing on the change in the employment relationship and the
emergence of "freedom of contract"); Shapiro & Tune, supra note 18, at 342-43; McWilliams, supra note 1, at 339. But seeLarson, supra note 19, at 227 (observing the lack
of judicial authority to support economic development theory).
23 BAAILY & GROSSMAN, supra note 14, § 1.5, at 11. The United States Supreme
Court first addressed the issue in Adair v. United States. 208 U.S. 161, 174-76 (1908).
The Court focused on the constitutionality of § 10 of the Erdman Act, which made
the termination of an employee based upon his membership in a labor union a misdemeanor, punishable by fines up to but not exceeding $1000. Id. at 168-69. The
Court held § 10 to be an unconstitutional violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. Id. at 172. The Fifth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: "No
person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law
.
-" U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Court concluded that the power to contract for the
purchase and sale of labor fell within the liberties granted by the Fifth Amendment.
Adair, 208 U.S. at 172. In so doing, the Court found an employer's discretionary
termination of an employee to be an exercise of rights inherent to personal liberty
and the right to property. Id.
In Coppage v. Kansas, the Supreme Court was presented with a Kansas statute
nearly identical to that of Adair. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 6 (1915). The plaintiff in Coppagewas discharged for refusing to withdraw from a railroad labor organization. Id. at 7. Relying heavily on the reasoning of Adair, the Court declared the
statute violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 26.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: "No State shall... deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
Only 15 years later, the Supreme Court withdrew the constitutional protection of
the at-will doctrine. BAKALY & GROSSMAN, supranote 14, § 1.5, at 12 (citing NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937)). In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., the Court considered the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, which
characterized the prevention of employees from engaging in union activities as an
unlawful obstruction of interstate commerce. Id. at 22. In upholding the Act, the
Court reaffirmed the employer's right to "organize its business and select its own officers and agents." Id. at 33. More importantly, the Court recognized for the first
time the fundamental right of employees to unionize. Id. The New Jersey State Constitution expressly protects this right by stating that "persons in private employment
shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively." N.J. CONsr. art. I, § 19. As
a result of Jones & Laughlin Stee the United States Supreme Court granted Congress
and state legislatures leave to restrict the previously uninhibited freedom enjoyed by
an employer in terminating its workers. BAIY & GROSSMAN, supra note 14, § 1.5 at
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New Jersey first embraced the employment at-will doctrine in
Bird v. J.L. Prescott Co., 241 which involved a dispute arising from an
alleged contract for lifetime employment.2 5 Recognizing such
agreements as attempts to limit the employer's powers of termination, courts rarely enforced lifetime employment contracts. 2 6 More
12. The National Labor Relations Act, coupled with the Jones & Laughlin Steel decision, constituted the earliest limitation to the at-will doctrine. Gidding, supra note 19,
at 1189 & n.13.
24 89 N.J.L. 591, 99 A. 380 (1916).
25 Id. at 591-92, 99 A. at 381. The plaintiff in Bird threatened to bring suit against
his employer after he was injured on the job. Id. To dissuade him from doing so, the
employer offered him lifetime employment, and reduced this offer to writing. Id. at
592, 99 A. at 381. Relying on an appellate decision, the court held that this promise
of permanent employment and its surrounding circumstances constituted little more
than a "friendly assurance of employment" that was too indefinite to amount to an
enforceable contract. Id. (citing Shaw v. Woodbury Glass Works, 52 N.J.L. 7, 9, 18 A.
696, 697 (1889)).
26 Savarese v. Pyrene Mfg. Co., 9 N.J. 595, 601, 89 A.2d 237, 240 (1952); see also
Fregara v.Jet Aviation Business Jets, 764 F. Supp. 940, 945 (D.N.J. 1991) (noting the
apparent reluctance by the courts to enforce lifetime employment contracts) (citing
Savarese, 9 N.J. at 601, 89 A.2d at 240) (other citations omitted). For a brief discussion
of the Savarese decision, see infra note 34 and accompanying text. While a promise of
just cause termination protects an employee from arbitrary termination, a lifetime
employment contract prohibits any termination. Fregara, 764 F.Supp. at 946 (citing
Shebar v. Sanyo Business Sys. Corp., 111 N.J. 276, 287, 544 A.2d 377, 382 (1988)).
Courts judged most contracts of this nature as too vague to be enforceable. Savarese,9
N.J. at 601, 89 A.2d at 240 (quotations omitted). To be enforceable, the terms of a
contract must be such that performance may be ascertained with reasonable certainty.
Friedman v. Tappan Dev. Corp., 22 N.J. 523, 531, 126 A.2d 646, 650 (1956) (citing
Savarese 9 N.J. at 599, 89 A.2d at 239); see also Alter v. Resorts Int'l, Inc., 234 N.J.
Super. 409, 414-15, 560 A.2d 1290, 1293 (Ch. Div. 1989) (refusing to enforce an alleged lifetime employment contract due in part to indefiniteness of terms).
An excellent argument against the contractual enforcement of policy manuals is
that such contracts are unilateral undertakings on the part of the employer to provide
lifetime employment, for which no corresponding obligation is imposed upon the
employee. See Savarese, 9 N.J. at 601, 89 A.2d at 240. Thus, the burden of performance is clearly unequal. See id. It is for this reason that an enforceable lifetime employment contract requires additional consideration beyond pre-existing employment
duties on the part of the employee. Id. (quoting Eilen v. Tappin's, Inc., 16 N.J. Super.
53, 56, 83 A.2d 817, 818 (Law Div. 1951) (terming such consideration "a device created by the courts to test whether or not the parties specifically and definitely intended to make such a contract.")); Alter, 234 N.J. Super. at 415, 560 A.2d at 1293
(citing Savarese, 9 N.J. at 602, 89 A.2d at 240); see also Piechowski v. Matarese, 54 N.J.
Super. 333, 344, 148 A.2d 872, 878 (App. Div. 1959) (describing additional consideration as ajudicially-created test of the parties' intention to enter into a lifetime employment contract); cf Carney v. Dexter Shoe Co., 701 F. Supp. 1093 (D.N.J. 1988)
(explaining that "long term" employment commitments are enforceable only if supported by consideration ancillary to the employee's continued work) (citations
omitted).
In more recent decisions, courts were less reluctant to enforce lifetime employment contracts. See, e.g., Shebar v. Sanyo Business Systems Corp., 218 N.J. Super. 111,
120, 526 A.2d 1144, 1148-49 (App. Div. 1987), affd on other grounds, 111 N.J. 276, 544
A.2d 377 (1988). Shebar involved an oral promise of lifetime employment, given to
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than forty years after Bird, the New Jersey judiciary imposed its initial restriction on employment at-will in Anthony v. Jersey Central
Power & Light Co. 27 At issue was the enforceability of a severance
pay provision in the defendant company's "General Rules." 28 The
Anthony court held that the provision constituted an enforceable
promise by the employer, despite the at-will status of the employees. 29 This decision laid the groundwork for the contractual enforcement of employee handbooks in Woolley and its progeny, in
that the employment
manuals in both cases were similar in distri30
bution and content
prevent Mr. Shebar from accepting employment with a competitor. See id. at 115-16,
526 A.2d at 1146. He was fired four months later. Id. at 116, 526 A.2d at 1146. Relying heavily on Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., the court upheld the oral employment contract, noting that contemporary interpretations of lifetime employment
more accurately describe it as employment terminable only for cause. Id. at 119-20,
526 A.2d at 1148 (citing Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 99 NJ. 284, 301 n.8, 491
A.2d 1257, 1266 n.8 (1985), modified, 101 NJ. 10, 499 A.2d 515 (1985)).
The NewJersey Supreme Court unanimously rejected this interpretation, finding
the Woolley analysis inapplicable and concluding that Savarese did indeed govern. See
Shebar, 111 N.J. at 288, 544 A.2d at 383; see also Brunner v. Abex Corp., 661 F. Supp.
1351, 1356 (D.NJ. 1986) (recognizing that WoolLey is "unmistakably limited, even in its
broadest interpretation," to written communications, and does not apply to oral assurances ofjob security). Nevertheless, the Shebar court upheld the contract, finding the
requisite additional consideration in Mr. Shebar's relinquishment of the competing
job offer. Shebar, 111 N.J. at 289, 544 A.2d at 383.
27 51 N.J. Super. 139, 143 A.2d 762 (App. Div. 1958).
28 Id. at 142, 143 A.2d at 763. The defendant company in Anthony had issued its
"General Rules" to the entire work force ofJersey Central. Id. This packet of employment information was very similar to modern employment manuals. See Woolley, 99
N.J. at 294 n.4, 491 A.2d at 1262 n.4. The General Rules included the union's provision for severance pay, covering both union and non-union employees. Anthony, 51
NJ. Super. at 142, 143 A.2d at 763. The plaintiffs, non-union, at-will employees,
sought the specified severance pay benefits after termination following the sale of the
company. Id., 143 A.2d at 763-64.
29 See Anthony, 51 N.J. Super. at 143, 143 A.2d at 764. The court refuted defendant's argument that the provision was a mere gratuitous promise unsupported by consideration" ruling instead that the provision constituted a unilateral offer that the
plaintiffs accepted by their continuation of employment. Id. at 143-47, 143 A.2d at
764-66. The court found consideration in the benefit bestowed upon the employer
from the increased productivity and employee morale flowing from the availability of
severance pay. Id. at 144, 143 A.2d at 764. Although the basis for the finding is unclear, the court also ruled that the employee suffered a detriment. See id. at 144-45,
143 A.2d at 764-65.
30 Grigoletti v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 118 N.J. 89, 117, 570 A.2d 903, 917
(1990) (acknowledging that Anthony formed a foundation for the Woolley opinion)
(citation omitted). In both instances, the manual was widely distributed to the work
force. Woolley, 99 NJ. at 298, 491 A.2d at 1265; Anthony, 51 N.J. Super. at 142, 143
A.2d at 763. Additionally, both cases presumed the reliance of the employee upon
the manual. Woolley, 99 NJ. at 304, 491 A.2d at 1268; Anthony, 51 N.J. Super. at 14546, 143 A.2d at 765. The Anthony court's analysis closely mirrors that of Woolley, both
decisions addressing and rebutting similar arguments. See Woolley, 99 N.J, at 304, 491
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THE EROSION OF AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT VIA THE EMPLOYEE
HANDBOOK

The NewJersey Supreme Court's landmark decision in Woolley
v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc."1 irrevocably transformed the employment policy manual into an enforceable unilateral contract, forever altering the at-will employment relationship in New Jersey.
The Woolley court held that absent an adequate disclaimer, an employer may be bound to the "promises" made in an employee
handbook, regardless of an employee's at-will status." The court
stressed the significance of the broad distribution of the employA.2d at 1268 (noting that the Anthony decision had conclusively disposed of "practically every contractual objection that could be made").
31 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257 (1985), modified, 101 N.J. 10, 499 A.2d 515 (1985).
32 Grigoletti, 118 N.J. at 116-17, 570 A.2d at 916-17 (describing the "quantum leap"
taken by Woolley as permanently altering the basic structure of the employment at-will
relationship); see also Donovan & Reilly, supra note 1, at 816 (explaining that Woolley
"broke new ground" in employment law); Marvin M. Goldstein, Current Status of Em-ployment-At-Will Doctrine, N.J. LAw., Nov. 1984, at 12, 13 (accurately predicting the New
Jersey Supreme Court's decision to be a "radical departure" from existing law);
Chagares, supra note 18, at 490 (anticipating the significance of Woolley on employment relations); Harris, supra note 10, at 727-28 (postulating that the decision will
result in a considerable reevaluation of the employment relationship). But see Brunner v. Abex Corp., 661 F. Supp. 1351, 1356 (D.N.J. 1986) (denying the assertion that
Woolley was a "revolution" in the field of at-will employment). At the time of the Woolley decision, the public policy exception was NewJersey's onlyjudicially created limitation on an employer's right of arbitrary termination. M. Joan Foster, In the Aftermath
ofWoolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, N.J. LAw., Aug. 1985, at 9, 9 (footnote omitted); see
infra notes 73-86 and accompanying text (discussing the public policy exception to
the employment at-will doctrine). Woolley was the first NewJersey case to hold that an
employment manual could be enforced as a legally binding contract.
CULLOCH, TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT:

KENNETH

EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE RIGHTS

J. Mc-

20,032

(1994).
33 Woolley, 99 N.J. at 285-86, 491 A.2d at 1258. The defendant fired Woolley, an atwill employee, after he refused to submit his resignation. Id. at 286, 491 A.2d at 1258.
Woolley's supervisors had twice requested his resignation, citing as cause a loss of
confidence in his work. Id. Although no written contract of employment existed between the plaintiff and Hoffmann-La Roche, Woolley filed a claim for breach of contract, relying on the defendant's "Personnel Policy Manual." Id. at 286-87, 491 A.2d at
1258. The employment manual contained five categories of employee termination, in
addition to termination procedures to be followed in the event of a termination for
cause. Id. at 287 n.2, 491 A.2d at 1259 n.2. The termination classifications included:
"'layoff,' 'discharge due to performance,' 'discharge, disciplinary,' 'retirement' and
Iresignation."' Id. No category in the manual addressed discharges without cause. Id.
The manual also stated that all employees who performed their duties "efficiently and
effectively" would be retained. Id. The court concluded that this language created an
implied promise that Woolley could be fired only for cause, despite his employment
at-will status. Id. at 285-86, 491 A.2d at 1258. The court then restricted the employer's powers of termination even further, directing that even if good cause existed,
an employee could not be released until all the termination procedures in the manual were satisfied. Id. at 307-08, 491 A.2d at 1270.
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ment manual among employees.14 Chief Justice Wilentz, writing
for a unanimous court, acknowledged that the opinion placed New
Jersey in the minority ofjurisdictions on the issue of whether representations in employment manuals have a binding effect on employers. 3 5 In a strained attempt to carve an exception to at-will
34 Id. at 298-99, 491 A.2d at 1265. The court noted that although the manual had
not been distributed to all employees, the determinative factor of its distribution was
that it covered all employees by its terms. Id. at 298, 491 A.2d at 1265 (emphasis
added). The court used this factor to distinguish employment manual cases from
those arising in the context of lifetime employment contracts. See id. at 293-96, 491
A.2d at 1262-64.
The appellate division, as well as the trial court, construed Woolley's claim as one
for lifetime employment, and accordingly found for the defendant under the strict
requirements of Savarese. Woolley, 99 N.J. at 289, 491 A.2d at 1259-60. See supra note
26 and accompanying text for a discussion of the requirements of an enforceable
lifetime employment contract.
Savarese involved an alleged breach of a lifetime employment contract. Savarese
v. Pyrene Mfg. Co., 9 N.J. 595, 597, 89 A.2d 237, 237 (1952). Mr. Savarese was employed as a labor foreman. Id., 89 A.2d at 238. Twelve years after joining Pyrene
Manufacturing, he was asked to play catcher on the company baseball team. Id. After
voicing concerns regarding injuries, a company vice-president orally guaranteed Savarese ajob for life. Id. Later that season, he sustained serious knee injuries, resulting
in the amputation of his knee cap. Id. at 598, 89 A.2d at 238. Nevertheless, he continued working until he was terminated 21 years later. Id.
The Woolley court distinguished Savarese, claiming that the latter pertained only
to individual implied promises to terminate for cause, while the facts of Woolley extended these promises to all employees. See generally Woolley, 99 N.J. at 292-300, 491
A.2d at 1262-66. Thus, the elements of additional consideration and clear and definite terms were abandoned for purposes of analyzing employee handbooks. Id. at
294-95, 491 A.2d at 1263. The court decisively concluded that Hoffmann-La Roche
intended for the entire work force to be advised of the promises contained in the
policy manual. Id. at 298, 491 A.2d at 1265. Perhaps in an attempt to make the opinion's analysis more palatable, the court arrived at this determination despite the fact
that the manual's distribution had been limited to supervisory personnel. Id.
35 Wooley, 99 N.J. at 294, 491 A.2d at 1262. See generally Muller v. Stromberg Carlson Corp., 427 So. 2d 266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (expressing "serious reservations"
as to the prudence of finding enforceability in vague implied employment contracts);
Beidler v. W.R. Grace, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1013 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (holding that an action
for breach of contract does not lie in an employer's failure to adhere to the provisions
of a personnel policy manual), affd, 609 F.2d 500 (3d Cir. 1979); Heideck v. Kent
Gen. Hosp., Inc., 446 A.2d 1095 (Del. 1982) (concluding that the unilateral statement
of company policies in an employee information booklet did not alter the plaintiff's
at-will status);Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 551 P.2d 779 (Kan. 1976) (finding the employment manual to be a mere non-bargained for unilateral expression of
company policy); Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 638 P.2d 1063 (Mont. 1982) (ruling
that a requirement contained in an employee handbook that the employer give notice prior to terminating an employee does not rise to the level of an enforceable
contract right); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 443 N.E.2d 441, 446 (N.Y. 1982) (Wachtier, J., dissenting) (observing that the court's determination that the manual constituted an enforceable implied contract was against the clear weight of a century of
New York authority). Cf Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86
(N.Y. 1983) (refusing to modify the at-will rule under facts similar to Woolley, preferring instead to reserve such drastic changes in the law to the province of the legisla-
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employment, the court abandoned the fundamental contract principles of offer, acceptance, and consideration, relying instead upon
assumptions of fact.3 6 The recent decisions of Witkowski v. Thomas
ture); Rizzo v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 237, 486 N.Y.S.2d 220 (App.
Div. 1985) (deciding that a handbook is not a contract if the employee does not know
of its existence).
The Woolley court opined that the majority of other jurisdictions declined to find
enforceable implied employment contracts in handbooks due to a confusion of the
issues and a misapplication of the law. Woolley, 99 N.J. at 294, 491 A.2d at 1263. This
argument was not without persuasive authority. See Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co.,
685 P.2d 1081, 1087 (Wash. 1984) (en banc) (announcing that the issuance of an
employee handbook may give rise to contractual obligations); Pine River State Bank v.
Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629-30 (Minn. 1983) (declaring that the employer was
bound by the employment manual); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292
N.W.2d 880, 892 (Mich. 1980) (upholding statements in a manual as enforceable contract promises). Contemporary jurisprudence has noted a shift of the principles and
rationale of Woolley from the minority to the prevailing view. Chagares, supra note 18,
at 477 n.98; Harris, supra note 10, at 728, 728 n.128. At least 33 states now accept this
interpretation. RichardJ. Pratt, Comment, UnilateralModification of Employment Handbooks: FurtherEncroachments on the Employment-at-Will Doctrine, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 197,
208 n.76 (1990) (listing cases embracing the now prevailing view of handbook
interpretation).
36 See Harris, supra note 10, at 728-32 (discussing the Woolley court's "unnecessarily
strained" contract analysis); see also 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 3.15a, at 244 (1990) (observing that results such as the holding of Woolly are
a "radical departure" from traditional contract jurisprudence). The New Jersey
Supreme Court departs from one of the most essential elements of contract law:
knowledge of the offer upon which a party's acceptance is premised. See Harris, supra
note 10, at 729. "An offer is not effective until it reaches the offeree." 1 FARNSWORTH,
supra, §3.10, at 212. The offer contained in the manual, which presumably modified
the at-will status of the employees in Woolley, never reached all of the intended offerees. Woolley, 99 N.J. at 298, 491 A.2d at 1265. In fact, the manual had only been
distributed to a mere 10% of Hoffmann-La Roche's 3000 member work force. Witkowski v. ThomasJ. Lipton, Inc., 136 N.J. 385, 395, 643 A.2d 546, 551 (1994) (citing
Woolley, 99 N.J. at 298, 491 A.2d at 1265). Breaking away from traditional contract
analysis, the court relied upon a 4-3 decision by the Michigan Supreme Court, rather
than the settled law of its own jurisdiction. Woolley, 99 N.J. at 303-04, 491 A.2d at 126768 (citing Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d 880, 892 (Mich. 1980)); see, e.g., Anthony v. Jersey
Cent. Power & Light Co., 51 N.J. Super. 139, 145-46, 143 A.2d 762, 765 (App. Div.
1958) (requiring that the employee be apprised of the contract terms). Other decisions relied upon by Woolley require that the employee have knowledge of the manual's provisions. See, e.g., PineRiver State Bank, 333 N.W.2d at 626 ("The offer must be
definite in form and must be communicated to the offeree."). It is of some significance that the Toussaint court cited no authority to support the proposition that the
employee's knowledge of the stated policies is unnecessary to form a binding contract. Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 892. One commentator suggested that the court in
Woolley "artfully presented" the facts in an attempt to support the reasoning concerning offer and acceptance. Harris, supra note 10, at 730.
Additionally, the court addressed whether the employees gave consideration to
support the promise. Woolley, 99 N.J. at 301-02, 491 A.2d at 1266-67. Contemplating
the fact that an at-will employee is free to quit at any time, the court found the employee's continuance of work in reliance upon the employer's promise to terminate
only for cause to be sufficient consideration. Id. at 302, 491 A.2d at 1267. However,

1508

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:1496

j Lipton, Inc.3 7 and Nicosia v. Wakefern Food Corp. 8 further perpetuate these undeniable deviations from traditional contract
39
analysis.
In Witkowski, the New Jersey Supreme Court continued the
crusade against the at-will doctrine by expanding the scope of enforceable policy manuals.' The plaintiff in Witkowski claimed that
his employer dismissed him in violation of the termination procedures outlined in the Lipton handbook.4 1 The court held that due
an attempt to apply this conclusion to an employee who never receives notification of
this promise results in an additional deviation from accepted contract principles. See
Harris, supra note 10, at 731. The court stated that under this scenario reliance will
be presumed, thusjudicially creating consideration where none exists. Wooley, 99 N.J.
at 304, 491 A.2d at 1268. This presumption of reliance far surpassed the contemporaneous endeavors of other jurisdictions to fashion an enforceable promise from an
employee handbook. McWilliams, supranote 1, at 356-57 n.98. Moreover, it is simply
unrealistic: even those individuals who actually receive the manual will probably not
read it until after they have been terminated. Roger B. Jacobs, Court Sets Limits on
Handbook Disclaimers, 138 N.J. L.J. 1086, 1110 (1994) (emphasis added). Seeking to
justify this position, Chief Justice Wilentz acknowledged that unless reliance is presumed, the court's attempt at restricting the at-will doctrine will be somewhat limited.
WooUey, 99 N.J. at 304 n.10, 491 A.2d at 1268 n.10.
It is somewhat encouraging to note, however, that the federal fora in New Jersey
have not completely acquiesced to the flawed reasoning of the state courts. See, e.g.,
Labus v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 740 F. Supp. 1053, 1062 (D.N.J. 1990). The
plaintiff in Labus did not read the manual until three years following his termination.
Id. The court wisely ruled that an employee cannot reasonably rely on a manual that
he had never seen. Id.; cf.House v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 232 N.J. Super. 42, 55, 556
A.2d 353, 360 (App. Div.) (noting that an employee cannot base a reasonable expectation ofjob security on a manual that he had not received) (citation omitted), certif
denied, 117 N.J. 154, 564 A.2d 874 (1989).
37 136 N.J. 385, 643 A.2d 546 (1994).
38 136 N.J. 401, 643 A.2d 554 (1994).
39 See Witkowski, 136 N.J. 385, 643 A.2d 546; Nicosia, 136 N.J. 401, 643 A.2d 554.
40 Alito, supra note 1, at 72.
41 Witkowski, 136 N.J. at 388, 643 A.2d at 548. Mr. Witkowski, an at-will employee of
nine years, was employed by Upton as a maintenance mechanic. Id. at 390, 643 A.2d
at 548. A routine government inspection uncovered a can of industrial lubricating oil
in Witkowski's locker. Id. Lipton dismissed Witkowski for the alleged theft of the oil,
notwithstanding his protestations that he had been given permission to keep the oil in
his locker. Id. Witkowski subsequently brought suit against Lipton, claiming, inter
alia, that he was wrongfully discharged under the provisions of Lipton's employment
manual. Id. at 389, 643 A.2d at 548. The trial court ruled that the manual's provisions concerning termination were not comprehensive enough to constitute an enforceable contract under New Jersey law. Id.; see Woolley, 99 N.J. at 287 n.2, 306, 491
A.2d at 1259 n.2, 1269 (denoting the termination clauses under review as a "fairly
detailed procedure" which was "explicit and clear"); see also Radwan v. Beecham Labs.,
850 F.2d 147, 151 (3d Cir. 1988) (postulating in dicta that it is unlikely that Woolley
would apply to manuals that do not contain disciplinary measures); Kane v. Milikowsky, 224 N.J. Super. 613, 616, 541 A.2d 233, 235 (App. Div. 1988) (explaining that the
memoranda in question did not provide comprehensive coverage of termination);
Ware v. Prudential Ins. Co., 220 N.J. Super. 135, 146, 531 A.2d 757, 762 (App. Div.
1987) (finding no limitation on an employer's power of arbitrary termination where
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to the manual's comprehensive job security provisions and extensive distribution, an employee could reasonably believe that the
manual created a binding implied contract of employment.4 2 In
contrast to the court's seminal decision in Woolley, the circumstances underlying Witkowski were more aptly suited to a unilateral
contract analysis, by virtue of the fact that the plaintiff actually received the manual.4" The court's interpretation of the manual's
provisions, however, reflected a continuance of the judicial activism embodied in the Woolley opinion.4 4
Witkowski principally focused on whether an employee could
reasonably expect to be terminated only for cause, based upon language contained in the employment manual.4 5 While acknowledging the absence of any bright-line test of reasonableness, the court
provided certain relevant factors to consider in determining
whether statements in an employment manual give rise to enforcemanual did not address causes for removal beyond poor performance), certif denied,
113 N.J. 335, 550 A.2d 450 (1988). But see Preston v. Claridge Hotel & Casino, Ltd.,
231 N.J. Super. 81, 86-87, 555 A.2d 12, 15 (App. Div. 1989) (enforcing manual containing representations of "maximum job security" coupled with graduated disciplinary procedures).
42 Witkowski, 136 N.J. at 399, 643 A.2d at 553.
43 See id. at 388-91, 643 A.2d at 548-49 (detailing the factual circumstances of the
case and content of the manual). Unlike the manual in Woolley, the manual in Witkowski was distributed to all Lipton employees. Id. at 395, 643 A.2d 551 (emphasis added). Thus, there was no need for Justice Handler, speaking for a unanimous court,
to create new law based upon faulty applications of contract doctrine. See supra notes
34-36 and accompanying text (illustrating the Woolley court's abandonment of traditional contract principles). In addition, the analysis of Witkowski does not suffer from
an unprecedented presumption of reliance to establish consideration. See supra note
36 and accompanying text (noting that the authority that forms the basis for the Woolley opinion retained the basic requirement that the offeree receive the offer). Edward
Witkowski had received the Lipton manual when he was hired. Witkowski, 136 N.J. at
390, 643 A.2d at 549. More importantly, the manual itself expressly substantiates a
claim of reliance by a discharged employee by providing that "[wie likewise try to
inform applicants about the job and company requirements and benefits in order
that they may decide whether or not they wish to accept employment." See id.
44 See infra notes 45-66 and accompanying text (demonstrating the court's willingness to impose an employee's unfounded expectations upon the employer in the Witkowski and Nicosia decisions).
45 Witkowski, 136 N.J. at 392, 643 A.2d at 550 (quoting Woolley, 99 N.J, at 297-98,
491 A.2d at 1264-65). Under Woolley, when the employer of a large work force circulates a manual that may be reasonably interpreted as providing incidental employment benefits, particularly job security, the courts are to construe them in view of the
reasonable expectations of the employee. Woolley, 99 N.J. at 297-98, 491 A.2d at 1264.
The court instructed that this standard is to be applied due to the fact that most
workers have little knowledge of contract law. Id. at 300, 491 A.2d at 1266. Thus, the
intent or true meaning underlying the statements in the manual are irrelevant; all
that matters is what the employee reasonably believed under the circumstances. See
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able promises.46 These factors include the definiteness and comprehensive scope of the termination and/or job security
procedures, as well as the context in which the manual was prepared and distributed. 47 Applying these inquires to the Lipton
manual,48 the court agreed with the appellate division that the
manual's provisions did indeed guarantee termination only for
cause. 49 Accordingly, the court established permissive criteria for
Witkowsk4 136 N.J. at 392-93, 643 A.2d at 550.
Id. at 393, 643 A.2d at 550.
The pertinent portion of the manual, entitled "Warning Notices," provided:
In fairness to both employees and the company we have a system of
warning notices for violation of company policies or rules. Employees
with poor records for lateness, absence, infringement of company rules
or sanitation and safety regulations will be spoken to by their supervisor.
A second infraction will mean a written warning, a copy of which is filed
with the Personnel Department.
If the employee's record does not improve sufficiently, he or she
will receive a second written warning notice. The third written warning
notice constitutes grounds for dismissal. In some situations, depending
on the seriousness of the rules' infraction, a suspension from work may
be given in addition to the first or second notice.
Some violations of company policies are grounds for immediate
dismissal. Some examples of these include:
1. Being unfit for work because of excessive use of intoxicants
2. Consuming intoxicants on the premises
3. Professional gambling on company premises
4. Fighting, wrestling and "horseplay" on premises
5. Clocking the time card of another employee
6. Insubordination
7. Stealing or unauthorizedpossession of Company property
Id. at 391, 643 A.2d at 549 (emphasis added).
49 Id. Based upon the company-wide circulation of the manual, coupled with what
the court found to be definite and comprehensive job security provisions, the court
reasoned that Lipton intended to be bound by these statements. Id. at 396, 643 A.2d
at 552 (citation omitted). It bears mentioning that the court judged the termination
procedures to be sufficiently comprehensive despite the fact that the handbook provided only seven grounds for immediate dismissal, expressly characterized as noninclusive. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (citing authority declining contractual enforcement of policy manuals due to lack of comprehensive termination
procedures).
This result is inconsistent with lower courts' application of Woolley, declining to
find enforceable contracts on grounds that the manual merely provided a non-exhaustive list of prohibited activity. Donovan & Reilly, supra note 1, at 829-32 (citations
omitted). For instance, a federal appeals court found no contract in a manual distributed by Beecham Laboratories that expressly stated that dismissal for cause would not
be limited to the six enumerated violations. Radwan v. Beecham Labs., 850 F.2d 147,
151 (3d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). A similar result followed from 27 causes for
disciplinary action listed in memoranda entitled 'Company Rules.' Kane v. Milikowski, 224 N.J. Super. 613, 616, 617-18 app., 541 A.2d 233, 235, 235-36 app. (App. Div.
1988); see also Brunner v. Abex Corp., 661 F. Supp. 1351, 1355 (D.N.J. 1986) (declining enforcement of employment manual as an implied contract due to absence of
enumerated termination proceedings). But see Schwartz v. Leasametric, Inc., 224 N.J.
46
47
48
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what may constitute comprehensive termination procedures under
Woolley.5 ° The court also postulated that continuing employment
beyond a probationary period could elevate an individual's at-will
status to that of an employee terminable only for cause.-" As a result of the Witkowski decision, employers must be very cautious
about what they include in company policy manuals, lest they become contractually bound by general information contained in the
manual.52
Prior to 1994, however, employers could take solace in the fact
that contractual liability for employee handbooks might be avoided
through the incorporation of an appropriate disclaimer. 53 PostSuper. 21, 24, 31-32, 539 A.2d 744, 745, 749-50 (App. Div. 1988) (finding an enforceable contract despite the express representation that the list provided was nonexclusive).
50 See Witkowski, 136 N.J. at 393-97, 643 A.2d at 551-52. In an analysis of the Lipton
manual, the court concluded that the selected examples for immediate dismissal gave
rise to the negative implication that an employee could reasonably expect continued
employment unless he committed one of the listed offenses. Alito, supranote 1, at 72.
As a consequence, the employer may be bound by something that was never stated
nor intended, but by subjective understandings imputed to those statements by an
employee. Id. at 73. A comparison of the single page treatment of the job security
provisions in the Lipton manual, supra note 48, to the exhaustive coverage of the
termination, disciplinary, and employee counseling procedures contained in the
Hoffmann-La Roche manual, clearly illustrates the extent of the opinion's expansion
of Woolley. See Woolley, 99 N.J. at 310 app., 491 A.2d at 1271 app.
51 Witkowski, 136 N.J. at 396, 643 A.2d at 552. In dicta, the court intimated that
successful completion of a probationary period which resulted in promotion to a "regular employee" may shield that employee from arbitrary termination. Id. (citing Fregara v.Jet Aviation Business Jets, 764 F. Supp. 940, 950 (D.N.J. 1991)). In Fregara,the
district court ruled that when a company reserves the right of arbitrary termination
during an employee's trial period, then the employee who "survives" does so with the
protection of termination for just cause only. Id.
52 SeeJacobs, supra note 36, at 1110.
53 See Witkowski, 136 N.J. at 400, 643 A.2d at 554 (noting that an employee handbook that constituted an implied employment contract could be negated by a proper
disclaimer under Woolley). The Woolley court stated that the inclusion of an adequate
disclaimer in the manual effectively prevents an employee from reasonably believing
that the employer had any intent to be bound to any statements contained therein.
Woolley, 99 N.J. at 309, 491 A.2d at 1271. A valid disclaimer eliminates the contractual
interpretation of the handbook as an offer capable of being accepted. Michael A.
Chagares, Utilization of the Disclaimer as an Effective Means to Define the Employment Relationship, 17 Horsr'RA L. REv. 365, 378 (1989). Furthermore, it puts the employee on
notice that he remains in an at-will relationship and thus may be terminated without
cause. NewJersey Supreme Court Strengthens Employee Handbook Exception to Employment-atWill, EMPLOYEE REL. NEWSL. (Grotta, Glassman & Hoffman, Roseland, N.J.), Summer
1994, at 1, 1 [hereinafter Grotta, Glassman & Hoffman]. Accordingly, the courts will
not construe the manual as an enforceable contract. Woolley, 99 N.J. at 309, 491 A.2d
at 1271. A "clear and prominent" disclaimer as defined by Woolley may be evidenced

by:
the inclusion in a very prominent position of an appropriate statement
that there is no promise of any kind by the employer contained in the
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Woolley decisions are helpful in determining the judicial acceptabilUnfortunately, the New Jersey
ity of handbook disclaimers."
Supreme Court's continued attack on the at-will doctrine has assured that the simple inclusion of a disclaimer offers little security
in today's employment relationships.5 5 Nicosia v. Wakefern Food
manual; that regardless of what the manual says or provides, the employer promises nothing and remains free to change wages and all
other working conditions without having to consult anyone and without
anyone's agreement; and that the employer continues to have the absolute power to fire anyone with or without good cause.
Id.
54 See, e.g., Preston v. Claridge Hotel & Casino, Ltd., 231 N.J. Super. 81, 87-88, 555
A.2d 12, 15-16 (App. Div. 1989) (denying the effectiveness of a disclaimer contained
in a revised handbook). The disclaimer in Preston stated:
It is the policy of the Company that this handbook and the items contained, referred to, or mentioned herein, are not intended to create,
nor should be construed to constitute, a contract of employment between the Company and any one or all of its personnel. This handbook
and its items are presented only as a matter of information and direction regarding Company policy, benefits and other useful information.
Id. at 87, 555 A.2d at 15. Apparently, Claridge provided no disclaimer in the first
handbook, which stipulated that maximum job security would be provided throughout the duration of employment. Id. at 86, 555 A.2d at 15. The court conceded that
the above disclaimer contained in the revised handbook unequivocally denied the
existence of any contract, and pointedly informed the reader that the handbook had
been distributed for informational purposes only. Id. at 87, 555 A.2d at 15. The Preston court focused on the fact that the disclaimer did not specifically address the provision concerning job security. Id. The court minimized the fact that every employee
was instructed to read the second handbook, as well as sign a form acknowledging its
receipt. Id. at 87-88, 555 A.2d at 16. It is unclear how any employee could read the
disclaimer in Prestonand reasonably expect that Claridge had any intent to be bound.
Donovan & Reilly, supra note 1, at 846.
The district court took a more conservative approach in Weber v. LDC/Milton Roy.
42 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1507 (D.NJ. 1986). The Milton Roy handbook
merely proclaimed that "'the statements (in the handbook) are in no way intended to
restrict management's obligation for final interpretation of its policies and procedures.'" Id. at 1518 (quotation omitted). The court found that no implied contract
existed. Id.
55 See Alito, supra note 1, at 74 (observing that an employer will have increased
difficulty complying with the disclaimer standards of Nicosia);Jacobs, supra note 36, at
1110 (predicting that courts will expect an employer to follow the terms of a policy
manual regardless of any disclaimer provided). NewJersey is not alone in this regard.
See generally Stephen F. Befort, Employee Handbooks and the Legal Effect of Disclaimers,13
INDUS. REL. L.J. 326 app. at 382-85 (1993). At least 45 opinions nationwide have denied recognition of the preclusive effect of a disclaimer contained in an employment
manual. Id. at 328.
An employer may overcome this problem by executing a written agreement of atwill employment with the employee. See D'Alessandro v. Variable Annuity Life Ins.
Co., No. 89-2052 (CSF), 1990 WL 191914, at *5 (D.N.J. Nov. 20, 1990) (noting that
legal authority indicates that an implied contract will not be found where a written atwill contract exists); see also Ware v. Prudential Ins. Co., 220 N.J. Super. 135, 143, 531
A.2d 757, 760-61 (App. Div. 1987), certif. denied, 113 N.J. 335, 550 A.2d 450 (1988).
Prudential Insurance Company employed the plaintiff in Ware as a district manager.
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Corp. 56 greatly expanded the disclaimer requirements set forth in
Woolley, thereby limiting the disclaimer's effectiveness.5 v
Nicosia, like Witkowski, involved allegations of misappropriated
company property.5 8 Wakefern Food Corporation employed Mr.
Id. at 136, 531 A.2d at 757. Upon his promotion to district manager, he signed a
written employment agreement. Id. at 138, 531 A.2d at 758. The contract established
that Mr. Ware was an at-will employee, subject to arbitrary termination. Id. He was
discharged for engaging in improper sales practices that were contrary to company
policy. Id. at 141, 531 A.2d at 759-60.
Ware brought suit for wrongful termination, asserting breach of contract premised upon a personnel manual entitled "Guide for Vice Presidents, Regional Marketing." Id. at 137, 139, 531 A.2d at 757, 758. Neither he nor any other district
manager received the manual. Id. at 139, 531 A.2d at 758-59. Ware contended that
his employment relationship was governed by the manual coupled with oral assurances of job security. Id. at 140, 531 A.2d at 759.
Relying on Woolley, the court rejected this argument, stating:
Since an employer may avoid any legally binding effect being given to
personnel policies set forth in a policy manual by a unilateral statement
[disclaimer] in the manual, it follows a fortiori that this effect may be
avoided by the execution of a written employment contract by which
the employee expressly agrees to an at will employment status .... Fur-

thermore, plaintiff may not avoid the explicit terms of his written employment contract by asserting that oral assurances of job security,
inconsistent with the contract, were given to him when it was executed.
Id. at 144, 531 A.2d at 761 (citations omitted).
56 136 N.J. 401, 643 A.2d 554 (1994).
57 See infra notes 60-65 and accompanying text (discussing the increased disclaimer
requirements dictated by Nicosia).
58 Nicosia, 136 N.J. at 405, 643 A.2d at 556. Anthony Nicosia had been an employee of Wakefern for over 18 years, and had received several promotions during
that time. Id. Merchandise had twice been unlawfully removed from a warehouse
that was under Nicosia's supervision. Id. Although never directly accusing him of the
theft, Wakefern dismissed Nicosia for failing to maintain the security of the goods and
for neglecting to follow company reporting procedures. Id. at 405-06, 643 A.2d at
556. Nicosia denied all allegations. Id. at 406, 643 A.2d at 556. Subsequent to his
termination, Wakefern discovered evidence which strongly implicated Nicosia in the
offenses. Id.
Nicosia brought suit for wrongful discharge, claiming that Wakefern had
breached its implied obligation to terminate only for cause. Id. at 405, 643 A.2d at
556. This assertion was premised upon 11 pages of Wakefern's employment manual.
Id. at 406, 643 A.2d at 556-57. In partial defense, Wakefern argued that the discovery
of the after-acquired evidence justified its actions by satisfying any "for cause" requirement asserted by the plaintiff. Id. at 417, 643 A.2d at 562.
The after-acquired evidence rule stems from a decision by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. See Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 864 F.2d 700, 704-08 (10th Cir. 1988). The rule states that after-acquired evidence precludes an employee's recovery for wrongful discharge. Id., 864 F.2d at 708;
Nicosia, 136 N.J. at 418, 643 A.2d at 562. This was a "novel and controversial" issue in
New Jersey in the context of employment manual cases. Id. at 418, 643 A.2d at 563.
Because it was not directly presented under the circumstances of Nicosia, the court
accordingly left its proper resolution for another day. Id. at 421, 643 A.2d at 564.
This decision was supported by the jury's determination that Nicosia had not been
guilty of conversion. Id. at 420, 643 A.2d at 564. Although there are no New Jersey
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Nicosia as a warehouse shift supervisor.5 9 During the course of his
employment, he claimed never to have received the portion of the
Wakefern manual containing the disclaimer.6" Nevertheless, the
court found that the extensive distribution of the Wakefern manual and its comprehensive termination policy satisfied the Woolley
prerequisites for the existence of an implied contract.6 1
state court decisions addressing this doctrine as applied to employment manual disputes, a recent opinion by the federal district court may provide some guidance. See
Massey v. Trump's Castle Hotel & Casino, 828 F. Supp. 314, 324-25 (D.NJ. 1993).
An employer typically attempts to use after-acquired evidence to later justify the
unlawful termination of an employee on discriminatory grounds. Nicosia, 136 NJ at
418, 643 A.2d at 562. The United States Supreme Court has recently ruled on the
admissibility of the after-acquired evidence rule in this context. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995). Christine McKennon had been an
employee of Nashville Banner Publishing Company (Banner) for over 30 years when
Banner allegedly discharged her in violation of the Age Discrimination Employment
Act of 1967 (ADEA). Id. at 882-83. The ADEA prohibits an employer from "discharging] any individual or otherwise discriminat[ing] against any individual ...
because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1) (1988). New Jersey's Law
Against Discrimination contains a similar provision, stating that "[ijt shall be . . . an
unlawful discrimination: (a) For an employer, because of... age ... to refuse to hire
or employ or to bar or to discharge or to require to retire, unless justified by lawful
considerations other than age, [an individual] from employment." N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 10:5-12 (West 1988). Banner sought to defend its actions by arguing that evidence
of McKennon's misconduct discovered at her deposition would have resulted in her
termination, notwithstanding. McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 883. The McKennon Court
held that the after-acquired evidence would not bar the employee's claim under the
ADEA and effectively excuse the employer's unlawful conduct. Id. at 883-84. Such
evidence may, however, be considered when assessing remedies such as back pay and
reinstatement. Id. at 886. The Court stipulated that if an employer wishes to rely on
after-acquired evidence, it must first establish that this evidence, standing alone,
would have justified the employee's termination. Id. at 886-87.
59 Nicosia, 136 N.J. at 405, 643 A.2d at 556.
60 Id. at 406, 643 A.2d at 556-57. Nicosia had received only the 11 page section of
the manual containing disciplinary procedures. Id. The entire manual consisted of
160 pages, with the disclaimer appearing in the first paragraph of the first page. Id.,
A.2d at 557. Although the manual had been disseminated to only 10% of the work
force, the court noted that approximately half of the Wakefem employees were unionized, and thus were covered by collective bargaining agreements. Id. at 408, 643
A.2d at 558. Generally, provisions of employment manuals do not apply to employees
under collective bargaining agreements. Ware v. Prudential Ins. Co., 220 NJ. Super.
135, 143, 531 A.2d 757, 761 (App. Div. 1987).
61 Nicosia, 136 NJ. at 408, 643 A.2d at 557-58. The court pronounced that a substantial number of employees had received the manual, thereby satisfying the first
Woolley inquiry. Id., 643 A.2d at 558. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing the extensive distribution requirement of a Woolley contract). The court also
found the scope of the termination policy to be sufficient. Nicosia, 136 NJ. at 409, 643
A.2d at 558. In sum, the court determined that the manual justified an employee's
reasonable belief that an implied contract had been formed. Id. The court dismissed
the defendant's argument that the trial court committed reversible error in evaluating
only 11 pages of the manual. Id. at 410-12, 643 A.2d at 558-59. While conceding that
Woolley dictates an examination of the entire manual, the court elaborated that such
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Embarking upon a discussion of the handbook's disclaimer,6 2
the court's analysis relied heavily upon the decision of a Wyoming
trial court in adopting more stringent requirements for disclaimers. 63 The court invalidated the disclaimer, largely upon the
ground that the Wakefern manual did not meet the Nicosia court's
newly articulated heightened disclaimer requirements.' Remarkaanalysis would yield the same result. Id.; see also Fregara v. Jet Aviation Business Jets,
764 F. Supp. 940, 953 (D.N.J. 1991) (submitting that a plaintiff must base a Woolley
claim on the entire manual, not solely on those provisions beneficial to him).
62 Nicosia, 136 N.J. at 412-17, 643 A.2d at 559-62. The Wakefern disclaimer
provided:
A. Introduction
This manual contains statements of Wakefern Food Corp. and its subsidiaries' Human Resource policies and procedures. (Hereafter referred to as "the Company"). The terms and procedures contained
therein are not contractual and are subject to change and interpretation at the sole discretion of the Company, and without prior notice or
consideration to any employee.
Id. at 413, 643 A.2d at 560.
63 Id. at 414-16, 643 A.2d at 561-62. In addition to obvious reliance on Woolley, the
court cited approvingly to Jimenez v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co. throughout the disclaimer analysis. Nicosia, 136 N.J. at 415-16, 643 A.2d at 561-62 (citing Jimenez v.
Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 690 F. Supp. 977, 980 (D. Wyo. 1988)). fimenez promulgated specific disclaimer standards beyond the "clear and prominent" requirement of
Woolley. Jimenez, 690 F. Supp. at 980; see also supra note 53 (quoting the Woolley disclaimer requirements). Underfimenez, a disclaimer must be conspicuous as a matter
of law to be effective. Jimenz, 690 F. Supp. at 980 (citations omitted). It must be
capitalized, enlarged, surrounded by a border, or set off in some other way to attract
the reader's attention. Id. Nicosia adopts this standard. Nicosia, 136 N.J. at 415, 643
A.2d at 561. New Jersey's adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code states that a
term is "conspicuous" when:
it is so written that a reasonable person against whom it is to operate
ought to have noticed it.... Language in the body of a form is 'conspicuous' if it is in larger or other contrasting type or color.... Whether a
term or clause is 'conspicuous' or not is for decision by the court.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:1-201(10) (West 1962).
The Wyoming Supreme Court also accepted the Jimenez requirements of prominence. McDonald v. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc., 789 P.2d 866, 870-71 (Wyo. 1990)
(Golden,J., specially concurring), aff'd on reh'g, 820 P.2d 986 (Wyo. 1991). The Nicosia court relied upon the McDonald case as well. Nicosia, 136 N.J. at 414-15, 643 A.2d at
561 (citing McDonald, 820 P.2d at 989). The plaintiff in McDonald signed a statement
acknowledging that his employment was terminable at the will of either party. McDonald, 789 P.2d at 867-68. The Mobil handbook reinforced this notion, explicitly stating
that it was not an employment contract. Id. at 868. Despite these blatantly clear indications of Mobil's intent not to be bound, the court found the disclaimer to be insufficient in preventing enforceable promises. Id. at 869-70. In a succinct dissent worthy
of notice, the chiefjustice attempted to assert a more rational analysis: "Mobil did all
it could by its disclaimer to assure that there was not a contract of employment. Parties are free to contract or not as they choose. Mobil chose not to contract with its
employee, and, like it or not, we should accept that decision." Id. at 871 (Cardine,
C.J., dissenting).
64 Nicosia, 136 N.J. at 415-16, 643 A.2d at 561. The court did not cite any New
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bly, the court also found that the disclaimer phraseology contained
"confusing legalese."6 5 The court rationalized the paternalistic
stance taken towards employees as furthering the stability of employment relations.6 6
In light of the foregoing decisions, it is clear upon which side
the New Jersey judiciary will fall in disputes concerning employment manuals. 67 Employers, notwithstanding express and unequiv68
ocal denials, are now bound by statements never communicated
and clearly never intended to have a binding effect.6 9 One way by
Jersey authority that previously elevated the Woolley disclaimer requirements to this
level. See id. at 412-417, 643 A.2d at 559-62; see also Donovan & Reilly, supra note 1, at
846 (observing that NewJersey law does not require a distinguishing print type to be
used; prominence is attained merely by placing the disclaimer on the first page of
text). Thus, in view of the judicial standards prior to the Nicosia decision, as illustrated by Donovan & Reilly, the Wakefern disclaimer clearly complied with existing
state law. See id.
65 Nicosia, 136 N.J. at 414, 643 A.2d at 560-61 (citations omitted); see supra note 62
(providing the text of the disclaimer in Nicosia). The court characterized the terms
"not contractual" and "subject to change and interpretation at the sole discretion of
the Company" as being beyond the comprehension of a reasonable employee. Nicosia, 136 N.J. at 414, 643 A.2d at 560-61.
Under Woolley, an effective disclaimer should contain the phrase "with or without
good cause." Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, 99 N.J. 284, 309, 491 A.2d 1257, 1271
(1985), modified, 101 N.J. 10, 499 A.2d 515 (1985). A strict reading of the "confusing
legalese" standard as applied by the Nicosia court, however, might invalidate a disclaimer utilizing this mundane term. See generally BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 692 (6th
ed. 1990) (defining good cause as generally meaning "a substantial reason amounting
in law to a legal excuse for failing to perform an act required by law") (citation omitted)
(emphasis added). The Nicosia court further cautioned against the use of terms that
are "manifestly unclear," because "clarity is essential" to the layman employee reading
the disclaimer. Nicosia, 136 N.J. at 414-15, 643 A.2d at 561 (citations omitted). The
court explained that the employee must not be burdened by the need to infer a disclaimer's meaning from the text of the handbook. Id. at 415, 643 A.2d at 561 (citation omitted). It must be noted, however, that the phrase "good cause" is defined as
"a relative and highly abstract term" whose meaning must be derived from the context
in which it is used. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 692 (6th ed. 1990) (citation omitted)
(emphasis added).
66 Nicosia, 136 N.J. at 419-20, 643 A.2d at 563 (quoting Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 66, 417 A.2d 505, 509 (1980)). See infra notes 74-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Pierce decision. Commentators, however,
argue to the contrary, inasmuch as the Nicosia and Witkowski decisions will undermine
private employment relations as never before. SeeJacobs, supra note 36, at 1110.
67 See supra notes 31-66 and accompanying text (discussing the disproportionate
weight of recent handbook decisions in favor of employee interests).
68 See supra notes 31-52 and accompanying text (discussing the judiciary's imposition of implied interpretations upon otherwise unambiguous explicit statements contained in policy manuals).
69 See BAKALY & GROSSMAN, supra note 14, at 48. The true intent of the employer in
creating and distributing a policy manual is simply to provide information about the
company to the employee and to establish positive morale. Id. Presuming an employer's intent to be bound by statements made in an employment manual is a "fatal
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which an employer may minimize potential liability under the
"handbook exception" to employment at-will is to include arbitration provisions in the employment manual.70 In fact, arbitration of
policy manual disputes is advantageous to employers and employflaw" undertaken by the courts. Larson, supra note 19, at 232; see also Befort, supra
note 55, at 343 (acknowledging that "most employers have no intention of extending
a contractual offer when issuing an employee handbook") (citation omitted); Massingale, supra note 17, at 209 (observing that "[t]he courts are finding implied contracts
where no contract was intended"). This is because employers produce policy manuals
for reasons other than to obtain the loyalty and productivity of their workers, such as
to change existing inadequate management-employee communications and to promulgate disciplinary matters. See Larson, supra note 19, at 232. As one editor of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts concisely stated, "[c] ourts frequently pretend that parties actually intended to be bound by what really are rules of law not ever considered
by the parties." Peter Linzer, The Decline of Assent: At-Will Employment as a Case Study of
the Breakdown of Private Law Theory, 20 GA. L. REv. 323, 355 n.133 (1986).
70 See Grotta, Glassman & Hoffman, supra note 53, at 2 (advocating the use of
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) as a means to resolve wrongful termination
claims); John A. Gray, Have the Foxes Become the Guardians of the Chickens? The PostGilmer Legal Status of PredisputeMandatory Arbitration as a Condition of Employment, 37
VnL.L. REv. 113, 115 (1992) (postulating that employers will impose mandatory arbitration as a condition of employment);Jacobs, supra note 36, at 1110 (suggesting such
means as a method for limiting judicial participation in employment disputes).
The inclusion of arbitration provisions in a employment manual may be particularly beneficial to an employer in a state such as NewJersey, where the law of wrongful
termination is adverse to the employer. ThomasJ. Piskorski & David B. Ross, Private
Arbitration as the Exclusive Means of Resolving Employment- Related Disputes, 19 EMPLOYEE
REL. L.J. 205, 211 (1993). The incorporation of arbitration clauses in an employment
handbook serves to diminish the likelihood of judicial review of employment decisions. Jacobs, supra note 36, at 1110. In 1984, in a dissenting opinion, the state's
highest court articulated the three principles of arbitration as: "(1) It is the voluntary
reference of a dispute by the parties to (2) an arbitrator or arbitrators chosen by the
parties who (3) agree the decision will be final and binding." Levine v. Wiss & Co., 97
N.J. 242, 257, 478 A.2d 397, 404-05 (1984) (O'Hern,J., dissenting) (citation omitted)
(footnote omitted).
In Barcon Assocs., Inc. v. Tri-County Asphalt Corp., the New Jersey Supreme Court
explained that "arbitration is 'a substitution, by consent of the parties, of another
tribunal for the tribunal provided by the ordinary processes of law,' and its object is
'the final disposition, in a speedy, inexpensive, expeditious and perhaps less formal
manner, of the controversial differences between the parties."' 86 N.J. 179, 187, 430
A.2d 214, 217-18 (1981) (citations omitted). The underlying purpose of arbitration is
to minimize, even eliminate, judicial interference in the dispute resolution process.
Perini Corp. v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., 129 N.J. 479, 519, 610 A.2d 364, 384
(1992) (Wilentz, C.J., concurring). New Jersey has long recognized arbitration as a
permissible way to solve disputes. Id. at 489, 610 A.2d at 369; Barcon, 86 N.J. at 186,
430 A.2d at 217. Accordingly, New Jersey courts will engage in judicial review of an
arbitrator's decision only where it "may be characterized on its face as gross, unmistakable, undebatable, or in manifest disregard of the applicable law and leading to an
unjust result." Perini, 129 N.J. at 496, 610 A.2d at 372-73. See generally Cheryl
Aptowitzer, Note, 24 SETON HALL L. REv. 998 (1993) (providing an extensive discussion of the Perinidecision and of the judiciary's "policy of great deference" to arbitration, resulting in limited judicial review of arbitration awards).
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ees alike. 71 Concerns regarding the enforceability of these arbitration clauses are unfounded because both New Jersey common and
statutory law dictate that these provisions be followed.72
71 See Massingale, supra note 17, at 187 (advocating the benefits of arbitration for
both parties to the employment relationship); Thomas J. Piskorski & David B. Ross,
supra note 70, at 209-10 (listing and discussing the "pros and cons" of private arbitration). Under the current judicial system, employers are subject to excessive damages
that are disproportionate to the pecuniary harm suffered by the discharged employee.
Massingale, supra note 17, at 187. The employee, on the other hand, is frequently
unable to enforce his legal rights due to the high costs of litigation. Id. Accordingly,
the foremost benefit of arbitration is the reduced litigation costs of each party.
Thomas K. Plofchan, Jr., Coming Home to Contract: Loosening the Death-Gripof Statutorily
Created Rights on Arbitration in the Non-Union World, 6 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 243,
244 (1991).
Arbitration of employment manual disputes would center upon the singular issue
of whether the employer discharged the employee in accordance with the manual's
provisions; peripheral issues are thus discarded, resulting in lower legal fees to both
parties. Id. at 246. Litigation costs are further reduced due to the speedy disposition
of arbitration proceedings, as compared with the lengthy and arduous adversarial
court system. See id. at 247 & n.21 (citing a report from Deloitte, Haskins & Sells,
indicating that, of 420 cases surveyed, arbitration resulted in dispute resolution averaging 443 days, while litigation proceedings encompassed 599 days) (citation omitted). Moreover, arbitration may provide remedies that are unavailable in the courts;
an arbitrator generally can reinstate the employee, whereas a court cannot. BAK.Lv &
GROSSMAN, supra note 14, § 14.1, at 267.
One may argue that arbitration clauses in employment manuals might result in
an employee's unwilling sacrifice of the judiciary's protection. Gray, supra note 70, at
116. It is conceded that available punitive damages may be somewhat reduced by
arbitration. BAKALY & GROSSMAN, supra note 14, § 14.1, at 268. It must be noted,
however, that an employee will not forego any substantive rights by the inclusion of
arbitration provisions. Gray, supra note 70, at 117 n.14. (citing Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)). The United States
Supreme Court has recognized this postulate with regard to statutory wrongful discharge claims. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 628. Arbitration also accelerates
the demise of what the employee surely perceives as an unhappy relationship, rather
than prolonging its existence through extensive litigation. Plofchan, supra, at 244. It
is also possible that arbitration provisions may be interpreted as a token of goodwill
towards the employee, as it provides a disgruntled employee an opportunity to settle
any disputes at the expense of the employer. Id. at 247.
72 See Thompson v. Joseph Cory Warehouses, Inc., 215 N.J. Super. 217, 220, 521
A.2d 881, 882 (App. Div. 1987) (per curiam) (applying the general rule that an employee seeking legal redress must first utilize the contractual grievance procedures)
(citation omitted).
As Nicosia illustrates, a manual rising to the level of an implied contract must be
taken as a whole. Nicosia v. Wakefern Food Corp., 136 N.J. 401, 411, 643 A.2d 554,
559 (1994). While the state courts of New Jersey have yet to address this issue directly
as applied to handbooks, a 1991 district court decision strongly supports this plenary
approach. See Fregara v. Jet Aviation Business Jets, 764 F. Supp. 940, 950-53 (D.N.J.
1991). The Fregaracourt observed that other jurisdictions have barred breach of contract claims arising from policy manuals where the complainant did not complete all
the enumerated grievance procedures. Id. at 951. The state judiciary, although limited to controversies involving collective bargaining agreements, has reached similar
results. Jorgensen v. Pennsylvania 1L.L, 25 N.J. 541, 557-58, 138 A.2d 24, 34 (1958).
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OTHER ALTERNATIVES

The law provides other, more logical causes of action for an
employee wishing to bring suit for wrongful discharge without resort to flawed applications of implied contract theory. 73 One avenue of legal recourse is the public policy exception,7 4 adopted in
In Jorgensen v. Pennsylvania R.R, the NewJersey Supreme Court specifically held that a
plaintiff must exhaust all contractual remedies prior to commencing litigation. Id. at
560-61, 138 A.2d at 36. The Fregaracourt examined NewJersey cases dealing with the
arbitration provisions of collective bargaining agreements and found these cases indistinguishable from handbook disputes. Fregara,764 F. Supp. at 951.
The NewJersey Legislature has also encouraged the use of arbitration as a means
of dispute resolution. Barcon, 86 N.J. at 186, 430 A.2d at 217. This is evidenced by
Chapter 24 of the New Jersey Statutes Annotated, entitled "Arbitration and Award,"
which states that:
A provision in a written contract to settle by arbitration a controversy
that may arise therefrom or a refusal to perform the whole or a part
thereof or a written agreement to submit, pursuant to section 2A:24-2 of
this title, any existing controversy to arbitration, whether the controversy arise out of contract or otherwise, shall be valid, enforceable and
irrevocable, except upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of a contract.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24-1 (West 1987). Section 2A:24-2 sets forth the parties who may
submit to arbitration:
Two or more persons by their agreement in writing may submit to arbitration a controversy existing between them at the time of the agreement, whether the controversy arises out of a contract or the refusal to
perform the whole or a part thereof or out of. any other matter. They
may also agree in writing that a judgment of a court of record, chosen
by them shall be rendered upon the award made pursuant to the
submission.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24-2 (West Supp. 1994).
73 See infra notes 74-92 and accompanying text (discussing alternative theories that
may be utilized by an employee who believes that he was wrongfully discharged); see
also Larson, supra note 19, at 230 (asserting that it is "entirely unnatural to torture
traditional contract law principles" to arrive at results better achieved by a public policy exception to the at-will doctrine); Linzer, supra note 69, at 356 (recognizing that
there are indisputable "serious conceptual objections" to a unilateral contract analysis
of employment manuals).
74 This is the prevailing tort theory of wrongful discharge cases. Wagenseller v.
Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1031 (Ariz. 1985); see also Befort, supra
note 55, at 332 (noting that the public policy exception is the most widely accepted
judge-made limitation on the employment at-will doctrine); Goldstein, supra note 32,
at 13 (listing, inter alia, "discharge for refusal to commit perjury, discharge for refusing to participate in a price-fixing scheme, discharge because of union membership
and activity, serving on a jury, discharge for filing a worker's compensation claim,
[and] discharge for reporting consumer protection laws" as examples of terminations
that violate public policy) (endnotes omitted); McWilliams, supra note 1, at 345 (distinguishing the "public policy tort" from contractual restrictions of the employment
at-will rule). In fact, only six states have failed to recognize this exception to employment at-will. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Implied Covenant: Anachronism or Augur?, 20 SETON
HALL L. REv. 683, 687 (1990). Prior to the adoption of the public policy tort theory, a
discharged employee seeking redress was limited to more traditional tort claims, such
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1980 by the NewJersey Supreme Court in Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.." 5 This exception is available to an employee who refuses
to violate a law or the public interest and is consequently fired.76
Pierce established that a right of action exists when an employer terminates an employee in violation of a "clear mandate" of
public policy. 77 Acceptable sources for determining public policy
are legislation, administrative rules and decisions, and judicial
opinions.7 1 Various opinions by the New Jersey judiciary have deas intentional interference with contractual relationships, fraudulent misrepresentation, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, or invasion of privacy.
Id. None of the foregoing causes of action allowed recovery for the wrongful termination itself. Id. at 687-88.
75 84 NJ. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980). Pierce constituted NewJersey's initial limitation
on the employment at-will rule. Id. at 77, 417 A.2d at 515 (Pashman, J., dissenting).
Pierce was a medical doctor involved in drug testing and research at Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. (Ortho). Id. at 62, 417 A.2d at 506. Pierce, an at-will employee, became involved in a medical and ethical dispute with her colleagues over research of
the drug loperamide. Id. at 62-63, 417 A.2d at 507-08. The doctor felt that Ortho
should cease testing the drug on children or elderly persons, due to the high levels of
saccharin it contained. Id. at 63, 417 A.2d at 507. She claimed that continued research of the drug violated her interpretation of the Hippocratic oath. Id. at 64, 417
A.2d at 508. Pierce was subsequently removed from the project. Id. at 63, 417 at 507.
Viewing this as a demotion, Pierce resigned and initiated a suit for wrongful discharge
against Ortho, claiming that Ortho's actions induced her to resign, and that she was
thus constructively discharged. Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 166 NJ. Super.
335, 338-39, 399 A.2d 1023, 1025 (App. Div. 1979), rev'd, 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505
(1980). A "constructive discharge" occurs when an employee resigns due to the
wrongful acts of the employer. Id.
76 Chagares, supra note 18, at 471-72. The public policy exception provides for a
right of action when the grounds for termination violate established mandates of public policy. Befort, supra note 55, at 333.
77 Pierce, 84 N.J. at 72, 417 A.2d at 512. This action may sound either in tort or
contract law or both. Id. The court supplied the caveat that the plaintifFs suit will fail
absent a clear expression of public policy, thus imposing only a limited restriction on
the employer's powers of termination. Id. The determination of whether this burden
has been met is a question of law, not fact. Warthen v. Toms River Community Memorial Hosp., 199 N.J. Super. 18, 24, 488 A.2d 229, 232 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 101
N.J. 255, 501 A.2d 926 (1985) (citations omitted). While this exception cannot be
criticized as unfair or unreasonable, it demonstrates the court's penchant for judicial
activism. See Pierce,84 N.J. at 87-88, 417 A.2d at 521 (Pashman,J., dissenting) (arguing
that the court has disregarded a "sound principle ofjudicial administration" by resolving a controversy involving extensive public policy concerns on a summary judgment
motion).
78 Pierce, 84 N.J. at 72, 417 A.2d at 512. Legislative enactments are the principal
sources of public policy. Citizens State Bank v. Libertelli, 215 N.J. Super. 190, 195,
521 A.2d 867, 869 (App. Div. 1987) (citing Pierce, 84 N.J. at 72, 417 A.2d at 512). The
Pierce court indicated that absent legislation, case-by-case determinations must be
made to determine viable rights of action under public policy theories. Pierce, 84 NJ.
at 72, 417 A.2d at 512. The court also identified rules of professional conduct as clear
expressions of public policy under the appropriate circumstances. Id. The court
noted, however, that a code of ethics serving only the technical purposes of an industry will ordinarily not suffice to establish a "clear mandate of public policy." Because
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fined the parameters of a Pierce public policy claim.79 In addition,
an employee may bring suit under the Conscientious Employee
81
Protection Act (CEPA),80 a codification of the Pierce doctrine.
Dr. Pierce had relied on her own conscience as the source of public policy, the court
found that her claim failed. Id. at 75, 417 A.2d at 514.
79 See Lally v. Copygraphics, 85 NJ. 668, 670, 428 A.2d 1317, 1318 (1981) (per
curiam) (involving a retaliatory discharge for filing workmen's compensation claims);
Cerracchio v. Alden Leeds, Inc., 223 NJ. Super. 435, 436-37, 538 A.2d 1292, 1293
(App. Div. 1988) (pertaining to an employee termination in violation of OSHA); Lepore v. National Tool & Mfg. Co., 224 NJ. Super. 463, 466, 540 A.2d 1296, 1297 (App.
Div. 1988) (involving a union member termination in retaliation for compliance with
reporting alleged OSHA violations), affd, 115 N.J. 226, 557 A.2d 1371 (1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 954 (1989); Kalman v. Grand Union Co., 183 N.J. Super. 153, 158-59,
443 A.2d 728, 730 (App. Div. 1982) (concerning public policy stemming in part from
professional code of ethics governing pharmacists). But see House v. Carter-Wallace,
Inc., 232 N.J. Super. 42, 49, 556 A.2d 353, 357 (App. Div. 1989) (finding no violation
of public policy where employer terminated salesman for voicing opposition to corporate policy), certif denied, 117 N.J. 154, 564 A.2d 874 (1989). Significantly, an employer does not violate public policy when retaliatory actions are taken against an
employee for exercising his individual legal rights. Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan
Co., 117 N.J. 539, 560, 569 A.2d 793, 804 (1990). Courts have also held that firing an
employee to avoid the payment of sales commissions does not constitute a violation of
public policy. Schwartz v. Leasametric, Inc., 224 N.J. Super. 21, 30, 539 A.2d 744, 749
(App. Div. 1988).
80 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:19-1 to 34:19-8 (West 1988). The legislative intent of the
statute was to protect employees from the retaliatory actions of their employers.
Moody v. Township of Marlboro, 855 F. Supp. 685, 689 (D.NJ. 1994). CEPA expanded the scope of retaliatory discharge claims available to an employee under common law. Young v. Schering Corp., 275 N.J. Super. 221, 223, 645 A.2d 1238, 1244
(App. Div. 1994) (citing Littman v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 709 F. Supp. 461,
470 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)). Accordingly, the statute is commonly referred to as the
"Whisteblower's Act." Parker v. M & T Chemicals, Inc., 236 N.J. Super. 451, 452, 566
A.2d 215, 216 (App. Div. 1989). The statute does not, however, provide a remedy for
the wrongful termination of an employee merely because the employee disagrees with
a lawful decision of his employer. Young, 275 N.J. Super. at 237, 645 A.2d at 1246
(emphasis added). Under CEPA, an employer may not take retaliatory action against
an employee who:
a. Discloses, or threatens to disclose to a supervisor or to a public body
an activity, policy or practice of the employer that the employee reasonably believes is in violation of a law, or a rule or regulation promulgated
pursuant to law;
b. Provides information to, or testifies before, any public body conducting an investigation, hearing or inquiry into any violation of law, or
a rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to law by the employer; or
c. Objects to, or refuses to participate in any activity, policy or practice
which the employee reasonably believes:
(1) is in violation of a law, or a rule or regulation promulgated pursuant
to law;
(2) is fraudulent or criminal; or
(3) is incompatible with a clear mandate of public policy concerning
the public health, safety or welfare.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-3 (West 1988). The Young court enunciated the factors that
the plaintiff must prove to prevail on a CEPA claim:
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A recent decision, however, has increased the difficulty in ascertaining legitimate dictates of public policy.8 2 In Hennessey v.
CoastalEagle Point Oil Co.,8 3 the state's highest tribunal blurred the
lines of what constitutes a clear mandate of public policy by significantly expanding the public policy exception.8 4 The Hennessey
court extended Pierceto include expressions of public policy found
in the state constitution.8 5 Justice Pollock, although concurring in
First, he must show that his belief that illegal conduct was occurring had
an objectively reasonablebasis in fact-in other words that, given the circumstantial evidence, a reasonable lay person would conclude that illegal activity was going on .... Second, plaintiff must show that he
disclosed or threaten led] to disclose the activity to a supervisor or public body, that he was fired; and that there is a "causal connection between [his whistle-blowing and his termination], that is, a retaliatory
motive played a part in the adverse employment [action]."
Young, 275 N.J. Super. at 233, 645 A.2d at 1244 (citation omitted).
81 Fineman v. New Jersey Dep't of Human Servs., 272 N.J. Super. 606, 617, 640
A.2d 1161, 1167 (App. Div. 1994). An employee claiming wrongful discharge under
CEPA is barred from asserting other wrongful discharge theories arising from the
same activity or event. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-8 (West 1988); Catalane v. Gilian Instrument Corp., 271 N.J. Super. 476, 492-93, 638 A.2d 1341, 1349-50 (App. Div. 1994);
see also Casper v. Paine Webber Group, Inc., 787 F. Supp. 1480, 1508-09 (D.N.J. 1992)
(ruling that the assertion of a CEPA violation waived a retaliatory discharge claim
under the NewJersey Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act). A CEPA
claim will not, however, prevent a companion wrongful discharge allegation arising
from the alleged violation of a handbook provision. Flaherty v. Enclave, 255 N.J.
Super. 407, 413, 605 A.2d 301, 304 (Law Div. 1992).
82 Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co., 129 N.J. 81, 111-12, 609 A.2d 11, 25-26
(1992) (Pollock, J., concurring) (noting that a public policy violation stemming from
a constitutional privacy interest is not as easily identifiable as a discharge that violates
more traditional sources of public policy); see also Alito, supra note 1, at 72 (observing
that Hennessey expands Pierce "beyond clearly stated and presumably easily discernible
policies of which employers are generally aware").
83 129 N.J. 81, 609 A.2d 11 (1992).
84 Alito, supra note 1, at 72. The plaintiff in Hennessey was an at-will employee in a
safety-sensitive position. Hennessey, 129 N.J. at 85, 107, 609 A.2d at 12, 23. Coastal
Eagle instituted random drug testing in 1986, without notifying its employees. Id. at
86, 609 A.2d at 13. Coastal Eagle fired Hennessey that same year after traces of marijuana and valium were detected in his urine. Id. at 87, 609 A.2d at 13. In his claim for
wrongful discharge, he alleged, inter alia, a violation of public policy arising from the
right to privacy guaranteed under article I of the New Jersey Constitution. Id.; see N.J.
CONST. art. I, 1 1, 7.
The state judiciary previously recognized the NewJersey Constitution as a source
of public policy in disputes concerning sex discrimination in the work place. Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 227 N.J. Super. 78, 84, 545 A.2d 812, 815 (App. Div.
1988) (proclaiming that public policy emanates from the fundamental liberties of the
state constitution) (citing Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd.of Trustees, 77 N.J. 55, 79-80,
389 A.2d 465, 477-78 (1978)), affd in part, rev'd in part, 117 N.J. 539, 567, 569 A.2d
793, 807 (1990).
85 Hennessey, 129 N.J. at 99, 609 A.2d at 19. In so doing, the court engaged in a
balancing test between the constitutional right to privacy and the public's interest in
safety. See id. at 99-108, 609 A.2d at 19-24. The court found that the safety-demanding
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the majority's decision, cautioned against the complexities of applying this latest restriction of at-will employment.8 6
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is also a
more practical method for limiting an employer's powers of termination by more conclusively enforcing an employee's "reasonable
expectations."" This covenant, a fundamental tenet of both tradinature of Hennessey'sjob and its vast potential for public injury outweighed any public policy concerns of an individual right to privacy. Id. at 107, 609 A.2d at 23.
86 Id. at 116-17, 609 A.2d at 28-29 (Pollock, J., concurring). Justice Pollock viewed
the common law of privacy rights as better suited for a clear mandate of public policy
than the constitution. Id. at 108, 609 A.2d at 24 (Pollock, J., concurring). The concurrence identified a distinction between the public policy underlying the right to
privacy and the public policy preventing other wrongful discharges. Id. at 111, 609
A.2d at 25-26 (Pollock,J., concurring). The crux of this dissimilarity, the concurrence
stated, is that neither the state constitution nor the legislature has expressly recognized a right to privacy, thus rendering any privacy-based violation of public policy
anything but "clear." Id. at 111-12, 609 A.2d at 25-26 (Pollack, J., concurring). Justice
Pollack advocated the more workable standard of public policy stemming from common tort law or from New Jersey's mandate against the illegal use of drugs, rather
than the exploration of "an uncharted constitutional right." Id. at 115-17, 609 A.2d at
27-29 (Pollock, J., concurring).
87 See generally Perritt, supra note 74, at 713-18 (suggesting that the implied covenant of good faith is a prominent reflection of the relational contract school, and is
thus consistent with the expectations of both parties). The relational contract school
focuses on the ongoing relationship between the parties, rather than upon strict adherence to classical contract doctrine. Id. at 713. Professor Perritt argued that the
obligation of good faith and fair dealing, as an integral concept of the relational theory, may serve to promote the "reasonable expectations" of the employees. Id. at 717.
Courts have utilized an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as an
exception to the employment at-will doctrine. McCuLLOCH, supra note 32, 1 40,011.
The rationale underlying this exception is that the employment relationship has created an obligation to discharge only for cause. Id. This covenant provided the foundation for the earliest encroachments upon the employment at-will doctrine. Perritt,
supranote 74, at 684. The duty of good faith prevents either party from acting in such
a manner that would impair the right of the other party to receive the benefits of the
contract. Palisades Properties, Inc., v. Brunetti, 44 N.J. 117, 130, 207 A.2d 522, 531
(1965) (quoting 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON & WALTER H.E. JAEGER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF CoNTRAcrs § 670, at 159-60 (3d ed. 1961)). It is breached when either party denies those benefits to the other. Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d
1025, 1040 (Ariz. 1985). An employer who does not act in good faith may be held
liable in tort for bad faith. Massingale, supra note 17, at 198. But see Noye v. Hoffmann-La Roche, 238 NJ. Super. 430, 436, 570 A.2d 12, 15 (App. Div. 1990) (concluding that in New Jersey, tort damages are not available for breach of the covenant as
applied to the employment relationship), certif denied, 122 N.J. 146, 584 A.2d 218
(1990).
The covenant is an implied-in-law promise, and is substituted for an implied-infact promise of the employer. Perritt, supranote 74, at 690-01. Thus, the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing can be used to imply assurances of job security which
cannot be effectively proven under implied-in-fact contracts, such as in Woolley and its
progeny. See id. at 702; see also id. at 686 (identifying handbook provisions as establishing implied-in-fact contracts). Accordingly, this theory of wrongful discharge does
not require the broad judicial assumptions inherent to the unilateral contract analysis
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tional and contemporary contract doctrine,"8 has advantages to
both employer and employee. 9 While the New Jersey Supreme
Court has never directly ruled on the covenant's application to the
employment relationship, the court has recognized that a covenant
of good faith and fair dealing is implied in every contract. 90 Nevertheless, the state judiciary has been somewhat reluctant to apply
this precept to the employment scenario.9 1 NewJersey courts have
of employee handbooks. See supranotes 31-69 and accompanying text (explaining the
New Jersey judiciary's strained attempts to apply unilateral contract analysis to employment manuals). Utilizing the most liberal interpretation of the covenant, a discharged employee wishing to assert this theory of wrongful discharge need not even
prove the existence of a contract. Perritt, supra note 74, at 690. The employee must
merely show that an employment relationship existed and that it was terminated in a
manner which was either unfair or in bad faith. Id. The implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing has received less recognition than any other limitation on the
employment at-will doctrine. Chagares, supra note 53, at 372.
88 Jeffrey M. Judd, The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and FairDealing: Examining
Employees' Good FaithDuties, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 483, 483 (1987). As explained by Professor Williston:
The underlying principle is that there is an implied covenant that
neither party shall do anything which will have the effect of destroying
or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract; in other words, in every contract there exists an implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing.
5 WILLISTON &JAEGER, supra note 87, § 670, at 159 (footnote omitted). The Restatement (Second) of Contracts contains a similar proviso: "[e]very contract imposes upon
each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981); see also NJ. STAT. ANN.
§ 12A:1-203 (West 1962) ("Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement."). "Good faith" is defined in
the Uniform Commercial Code as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned." NJ. STAT. ANN. § 12A:1-201(19) (West 1962).
89 See Massingale, supra note 17, at 200 (noting that a disclaimer has no effect on
the employer's duty to exercise good faith); Perritt, supranote 74, at 691 (explaining
that when bringing suit for breach of the implied covenant of good faith, an employee must overcome a higher burden of proof; he must establish bad faith or ulterior motivation on the part of the employer). At least one commentator has
proposed that the employer should have a tort claim against the employee for breach
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in the employment contract.
See generallyJudd, supra note 88 (advocating this theory). Judd also asserted that, at
the very least, the covenant should be used as a defense to a wrongful discharge claim.
Id. at 513.
90 Onderdonk v. Presbyterian Homes, 85 N.J. 171, 182, 425 A.2d 1057, 1062
(1981) (citations omitted); Association Group Life, Inc. v. Catholic War Veterans, 61
N.J. 150, 153; 293 A.2d 382, 384 (1972) (per curiam); Palisades Properties Inc., v.
Brunetti, 44 NJ. 117, 130, 207 A.2d 522, 531 (1965) (quotation omitted).
91 See McQuitty v. General Dynamics Corp., 204 N.J. Super. 514, 519-20, 499 A.2d
526, 529 (App. Div. 1985). In McQuitty, the plaintiff attempted to assert that his expired labor contract and the defendant's alleged practice of terminating only for
cause had created an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at 518, 499
A.2d at 528. The court rejected the contention that Woolley supported this assertion,
ruling instead that Woolley was limited to unilaterally adopted, published employment
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only recently accepted this theory as a limitation on employment
at-will.92
policies. Id. at 519-20, 499 A.2d at 529; accord House v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 232 NJ.
Super. 42, 55, 556 A.2d 353, 360 (App. Div. 1989) (quotation omitted); Citizens State
Bank v. Libertelli, 215 N.J. Super. 190, 194, 521 A.2d 867, 869 (App. Div. 1987); see
also Labus v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 740 F. Supp. 1053, 1063 (D.N.J. 1990)
("New Jersey law does not recognize an implied covenant of good faith in employment contracts.") (citations omitted); D'Alessandro v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co.,
No. 89-2052 (CSF), 1990 WL 191914, at *5 (D.N.J. Nov. 20, 1990) (asserting that New
Jersey has uniformly renounced the argument that an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing exists in an employment at-will relationship) (citations omitted); Carney v. Dexter Shoe Co., 701 F. Supp. 1093, 1103 (D.N.J. 1988) (noting the McQuitty
court's rejection of same); Brunner v. Abex Corp., 661 F. Supp. 1351, 1356 (D.N.J.
1986) (same).
Courts have generally declined to attribute an obligation of good faith and fair
dealing to the employment relationship, voicing concerns of undue restrictions on
managerial discretion. WagenseUer, 710 P.2d at 1039; see also Thompson v. St. Regis
Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1086 (Wash. 1984) (refusing to adopt the covenant as a
restriction on employment at-will, stating that "[a]n employer's interest in running
his business as he sees fit must be balanced against the interest of the employee in
maintaining his employment and this exception does not strike the proper balance")
(citations omitted). As late as 1989, only 13 states had recognized the covenant as
applied to employment law. SeeJaclin v. Sea-Land Corp., No. 86-2791 (AMW), 1989
WL 200943, at *4 n.1 (D.N.J. Aug. 23, 1989) (listing the cases that have recognized
implied covenants in employment manuals as enforceable).
92 See Fregara v. Jet Aviation Business Jets, 764 F. Supp. 940, 953 (D.N.J. 1991)
(observing that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing applies to the
employment context). The court noted that under NewJersey law, an employer may
be liable for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing if the employee is terminated without an "honest belief that good cause for discharge in fact
exists." Id. (citing Noye v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 238 N.J. Super. 430, 431-32, 570
A.2d 12, 13 (App. Div. 1990), cert. denied, 122 N.J. 146, 584 A.2d 218 (1990); Nolan v.
Control Data Corp., 243 N.J. Super. 420, 421-22, 579 A.2d 1252, 1253 (App. Div.
1990)). See alsoJaclin,No. 86-2791 (AMW), 1989 WL 200943, at *3 (stating that New
Jersey has clearly recognized an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
employment contracts).
In Noye v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., the court concluded that "[ilt is undoubted
that a Woolley contract, like any other contract, contains an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing." Noye, 238 N.J. Super. at 432, 570 A.2d at 13. Hoffman-La
Roche terminated Noye for allegedly sexually harassing a female co-worker. Id. at
431, 570 A.2d at 13. Noye denied this, contending that Hoffmann-La Roche fired
him without the opportunity to rebut the allegations and in violation of the disciplinary procedures outlined in the "Employee Policies & Procedures" manual. Id. The
court ruled that an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was created when
the plaintiff accepted, through continued employment, the terms of employment as
outlined in the manual. Id. at 432, 570 A.2d at 13.
Judge Stein, concurring with the majority, offered a definition of the covenant as
applied to the employment context: "an action for breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing will lie where the employer, without an honest belief that
good cause for discharge in fact exists, attempts to deprive the employee of the benefit of the employment agreement." Id. at 442, 570 A.2d at 18 (Stein, J., concurring).
The court further explained that a reasonable belief that good cause existed for the
termination will bar claims for breach of the covenant. See id. at 433, 570 A.2d at 13.
The court stipulated, however, that the covenant does not apply to purely at-will rela-
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CONCLUSION

In an effort to balance the distribution of power in the employment relationship, the New Jersey judiciary has sacrificed fundamental principles of common law9" and common sense.94
Subject to constant attack, the employment at-will doctrine essentially exists in name only in the state of New Jersey. The recent
extensions of Woolley in Witkowski and Nicosia will continue to chill
the assertion of an employer's discretionary rights.9 5 These decisions have created an environment wherein an employer is severely
restricted from taking disciplinary action, regardless of the legitimacy of doing so. Due to the ease with which a discharged employee may bring suit, an employer is justified in fearing that
litigation will result from routine managerial decisions.9 6 Furthermore, an employee may claim to have been "constructively fired"
tionships, where there is no contract express or implied. Id. at 434, 570 A.2d at 14
(citations omitted). The court also held that tort damages were not available for
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in employment contracts. Id. at 436, 570 A.2d at 15.
93 This is most clearly evidenced by the Woolley decision, in which the traditional
prerequisites to contract formation were abandoned. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text (detailing the Woolley court's departure from common law
principles).
94 For example, consider Woolley, in which the court presumed that an employee
could rely upon a document that he never knew existed. Woolley v. Hoffmann-La
Roche, Inc., 99 NJ. 284, 304, 491 A.2d 1257, 1268 (1985), modified, 101 NJ. 10, 499
A.2d 515 (1985). Nicosia is also illustrative of the absence of clear reasoning on the
part of the court with respect to termination clauses in employment handbooks. Nicosia v. Wakefern Food Corp., 136 N.J. 401, 643 A.2d 554 (1994). The NewJersey Supreme
Court announced a need "to protect the stability of employment relations and to
encourage certainty with respect to employment rights and obligations." Id. at 419,
643 A.2d at 563. The Witkowski and Nicosia decisions, however, do little to "stabilize"
or inject "certainty" into the employment arena. Jacobs, supra note 36, at 1110. The
only result of these decisions that employers may be "certain" of is that nearly every
termination decision made may be the subject of judicial review. Id.
95 See Massingale, supra note 17, at 208-09 (noting that the threat of court action
and the assessment of punitive damages may chill business decision making practices). Employers must now balance the merits of even the most routine termination
decision against the possibility of potential litigation. Id. at 202. Thus, an employer is
prevented from running a business in the most efficient manner possible, for fear of
civil prosecution. Id. In fact, common business decisions, particularly those pertaining to employee dismissal, have effectively been taken from the employer and given to
the unidentified members of an uncontemplated jury. Roger B.Jacobs, Court Rulings'
Result: Manuals Are Contracts, 138 N.J. L.J. 974, 1000 (1994). Apprehension ofjudicial
reversal may effectively "paralyze" the human resource departments of many companies. Id.
96 See Alfred W. Blumrosen, Why Employers Should Arbitrate Individual Employment
Claims, N.J. LAw., Nov. 1984, at 39, 40 (observing that virtually any discharged employee may bring a claim that would subject an employer's decisions to judicial
review).
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by a demotion or other disciplinary action and may bring suit
under exaggerated breach of contract theories or ill-defined public
97
policy exceptions.
In a one-sided analysis, the court has absolutely abandoned
the reasonable expectations of the employer.9" Nicosia and Witkowski effectively eliminate any chance for an employer to successfully
insulate himself from contractual liability when firing an otherwise
at-will employee.99 Moreover, the decisions are riddled with inconsistencies. For instance, an employee is given wide latitude to "reasonably expect" virtually any binding obligation from the
employer, while the employer is not permitted to "reasonably expect" an employee to understand common English. 10 The court,
in characterizing a simple disclaimer as "confusing legalese,"
judges that the average employee does not possess the cognitive
ability to identify a disclaimer as such. Nonetheless, the same court
infuses the average employee with the knowledge to ascertain
when the unwritten word creates implied contractual obligations.
The court cited the need for both stability in the employment
relationship and certainty regarding employment rights and obligations as justification for the recent handbook decisions. The
court achieves neither objective. Stability in the employment relationship is compromised by the unbounded contestability of emEpstein, supra note 1, at 972. As Professor Epstein stated:
Now the employer will have to reconsider every aspect of personnel relations. If it is improper to dismiss at will, then it becomes improper to
demote or to transfer at will, for an employee will be able to assert with
perfect propriety that the employer had made work so unattractive to
him that his conduct should amount to a "constructive dismissal" for
which either damages or reinstatement is appropriate. Thus a rule that
starts with modest ambitions will in the end regulate each and every
aspect of the employment relationship.
Id. The plaintiff in Pierce is an excellent example of a situation where an employee
may plead constructive dismissal as basis for a wrongful termination claim. See supra
note 75 and accompanying text (detailing the facts of Pierce).
98 See generally Brake, supra note 22, at 223-34 (arguing that the "legitimate countervailing interests" of the employer must be considered when analyzing employee
discharge cases); see also Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 551 (N.H. 1974)
(noting that "[iun all employment contracts, whether at will or for a definite term, the
employer's interest in running his business as he sees fit must be balanced against the
interest of the employee in maintaining his employment, and the public's interest in
maintaining a proper balance between the two").
99 Jacobs, supra note 36, at 1110. As a result of these decisions, employers will be
unsure as to whether or not they have satisfied the judiciary's requirements until they
are litigating the issue. Id; see also supra note 64 and accompanying text (illustrating
that the Nicosia court retroactively applied its own newly created standards to invalidate the disclaimer at issue).
100 Alito, supra note 1, at 73.
97
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ployment rights' resulting in judicial review of employment
decisions years after the fact. 01 Moreover, as the appellate division
observed, any expansions of employee rights are more appropri10 2
ately addressed to the legislature, and not to the judiciary.
It is uncontroverted that some employers will abuse their positions of authority, resulting in unconscionable employee terminations that must be redressed by the courts. 103 Misapplication of
fundamental contract law, however, does not adequately address or
rectify such injustices. 10 4 The court grants a right of action premised upon statements in a manual never read by the discharged
employee, yet incongruously denies the legitimacy of disclaimers
that do not sufficiently draw the reader's attention. Such a skewed

101 See Massingale, supra note 17, at 187 (contending that the current status of the
doctrine of at-will employment "offers little certainty as to whether a particular dismissal decision will result in liability for wrongful termination").
102 Noye v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 238 N.J. Super. 430, 437, 570 A.2d 12, 16
(App. Div. 1990). The court propounded that "if a need exists for an expansion of
employees' rights, it should be done by our legislature, which has never been reluctant to protect workers and is better equipped to study the matter and consider its
broad implications." Id.
103 Massingale, supra note 17, at 200; see id. (noting the disparity of bargaining
power in the employer/employee relationship).
104 McWilliams, supra note 1, at 371 (explaining that only a strict application of
unilateral contract analysis justifies the restriction of employment at-will). McWilliams stressed that a strict contract analysis ensures that only where an employee is
aware of the manual's terms will the manual be enforced against the employer. Id. at
371 n.194; see also supranote 36 and accompanying text (citing authority for the proposition that the offeree must receive the offer for the offeror to be contractually
bound).
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dichotomy of reasoning not only undermines the jurisprudential
foundation of the decisions, it compromises the integrity of the
law. 105
Keith J. Rosenblatt

105 See Bankey v. Storer Broadcasting Co. (In re Certified Question), 443 N.W.2d
112, 116-17 (Mich. 1989) (noting that "[w]hile a majority ofjurisdictions now recognize some type of 'handbook exception' to the employment-at-will doctrine, there is
no clear consensus as to either the legal theory supporting the handbook exception
or the scope of the exception") (citing Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292
N.W.2d 880, 892 (Mich. 1980); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 627
(Minn. 1983); Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 285, 491 A.2d 1257,
1258 (1985), modified, 101 N.J. 10, 499 A.2d 515 (1985); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc.,
443 N.E.2d 441, 447 (N.Y. 1982) (Wachtler, J., dissenting)) (other citations omitted);
Befort, supranote 55, at 342-43 (recognizing that a unilateral contract analysis is inappropriate for handbook analysis because the contractual elements are "implied by the
court rather than intended by the parties"); Linzer, supranote 69, at 345 (contending
that courts find binding promises in employment manuals "under circumstances that
would probably garner a first-year Contracts student an F for saying that a contract
was formed at all"); McWilliams, supra note 1, at 372 (criticizing the WooUey court's
presumption of reliance as undermining "the very justification upon which the employer's promise is enforced").

